Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process by Brilmayer, Lea & Norchi, Charles
FEDERAL EXTRATERRITORIALITY
AND FIFTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
Lea Brilmayer* and Charles Norchi* "
Currently, defendants subject to the extraterritorial application of federal
law generally do not invoke the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
to limit the application of federal statutes. Defendants subject to extrater-
ritorial application of state law, on the other hand, quite often succeed in
making analogous Fourteenth Amendment due process arguments. In this
Article, Brilmayer and Norchi contend that courts should recognize Fifth
Amendment limits on choice of law in the context offederal extraterritoriality
in the same manner that they recognize Fourteenth Amendment limits on
state extraterritoriality. Surveying a number of prominent recent cases,
Brilmayer and Norchi examine how the application of Fifth Amendment
constraints would alter the results in these cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
B Y some accounts, American movie and record producers lose close
to half a billion dollars in licensing fees annually when foreign
entrepreneurs reproduce and sell American products without author-
ization and when foreign governments simply look the other way.'
What if our government passed a law providing treble damages for
all unlicensed copying or playing for profit of American tapes any-
where in the world? If a foreign broadcaster who played a copy of
an American cassette over the radio in her own country (where such
transmission was legal) were sued in American courts, one would
expect her to resent this application of American laws. 2 Under current
law, what would be her best defense?
*Benjamin F. Butler Professor, New York University Law School.
** Tutor in Law and J.S.D. Candidate, Yale Law School. The authors wish to thank Maria
Chedid and Cheryl DeFillipo for their much-appreciated contributions to this article. Sam
Estreicher, Larry Kramer, Hans Linde, Howard Shapiro, and Russell Weintraub were generous
enough to comment on an earlier draft. The authors also would like to thank Howard Shapiro
for bringing the cases cited in note 226 to their attention.
I See Piracy, Moral Rights Are Focus of Senate Panel Hearings on Berne Convention Bills,
5 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. io, at 333-34 (Mar. 9, 1988) (discussing testimony of Motion
Picture Association of America, Inc. representative David Brown before Senate Judiciary Sub-
committee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, Mar. 3, 1988).
2 Compare this to Grundman's oft-quoted observation: "In the past twenty-five years, the
United States has had three major exports: rock music, blue jeans, and United States law. The
first two have acquired an acceptance the last can never achieve. People resent being told what
to do." V. Rock Grundman, The New Imperialism: The Extraterritorial Application of United
States Law, 14 INT'L LAW. 257, 257 (,980).
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Presently, the most effective defense in extraterritoriality cases is
likely to be that Congress did not intend the statute to apply to the
particular fact pattern in question. 3 Assume, however, that our hy-
pothetical statute was clearly intended to cover even non-Americans
who legally acquired tapes in their home countries and copied or
played them according to the law in effect there. This first defense,
then, fails. A second defense might be that extending American law
to such a case would violate international law, because international
law limits the extent to which a state may apply its own laws to cases
composed predominately of foreign elements. 4 This defense is even
less likely to succeed than the first, and for the same reason: congres-
sional intent is clear, and current doctrine allows Congress to override
international law as long as it is sufficiently specific.
5
So our hypothetical defendant seems to be out of luck. Compare
her plight to the legal posture of a second foreign defendant, this one
protesting extraterritorial application of state law on some similar issue
(for example, common law fraud or unfair trade practices). Again,
assume that the state legislature that wrote the statute has sufficiently
specified that the statute is designed to apply to the conduct at issue
in the case. Regarding defenses based on statutory interpretation 6 or
common law choice of law rules, 7 our second defendant is in the same
3 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., III S. Ct. 1227, 1236 (igi); Vermilya-Brown
Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 389-o (1948). See generally LEA BRILMAYER, JACOB CORRE,
ELIZABETH HENDERSON-ESTY, JILL FISCH, JOHN FIRESTONE; SARAH GORDON, JIM HUTTEN-
HOWER, NIKI KUCKES, MARGARET MARR, KATHLEEN PAISLEY & AVA SPENCER, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL SYSTEM 298 (1986) [hereinafter BRIL-
MAYER, AN INTRODUCTION] (discussing the importance of congressional intent in the application
of American law abroad); Lea Brilmayer, The Extraterritorial Application of American Law: A
Methodological and Constitutional Appraisal, 5o LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at
ii, 14 [hereinafter Brilmayer, Appraisal] (same).
There is no fixed meaning for the term "extraterritoriality." Certainly, it means that some
factors in the case are foreign rather than domestic. But which ones? Is a statute being applied
"extraterritorially" when the case involves a foreign defendant acting within the United States?
When it involves a local defendant acting abroad? As used here, a case involves extraterrito-
riality when at least one relevant event occurs in another nation. Cases in which all events
occur in the United States are unlikely to raise serious constitutional due process issues, even
when the defendant is a foreign national. Thus, whether or not one considers these to constitute
cases of extraterritoriality need not be addressed in this article.
4 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (1987).
5 See id. § 1I5(I)(a); BRILMAYER, AN INTRODUCTION, supra note 3, at 298 & n.4o (citing
cases). Some commentators argue that the elected branches should be bound by international
law, at least in certain circumstances. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional
Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy 'and International Law, 71 VA. L. REv. 1071, 1075-
76 (1985). This suggestion, however, has not yet been adopted by the courts.
6 See, e.g., Bernkrant v. Fowler, 360 P.2d 9o6, 9io (Cal. I961) (examining the policy
considerations underlying a California statute to resolve an interstate conflicts question); People
v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d 480, 481-83 (Cal. 1957) (interpreting the legislative intent
behind a California statute to resolve an interstate conflicts question).
7 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 311 (1934) (setting forth the
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position as the first: the dictates of the legislature defeat each of his
arguments.
But in other respects, the posture of our second defendant is rather
different from that of the first. Defendants protesting the application
of state law to international cases rarely make arguments based on
international law.8 Instead, when faced with state legislative over-
reaching, defendants tend to fall back on the United States Consti-
tution, and in particular on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 This is so even when the case exhibits international
and not purely interstate elements.10 On the other hand, although
defendants faced with federal legislative overreaching do raise argu-
ments based upon international law," they rarely rely on the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the federal analog of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 12 This difference is
"place of contracting" rule for contract cases); id. § 377 (setting forth the "place of wrong" rule
for tort cases).
8 Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, state conflicts cases occasionally cited
international law as placing limits on state power. See, e.g., Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co.,
242 U.S. 394, 401 (1917) (noting that "long before the adoption of the i4 th Amendment" courts
applied "the rules of international law" to resolve questions of state law jurisdiction).
Today, state cases rarely, if ever, rely on international law to restrict choice of law. We
surveyed a number of well-known state choice of law cases with international elements, and
searched for references to international law or to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations
Law. See In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff'd, 490 U.S. 112
(1989); Wong v. Tenneco, Inc., 702 P.2d 570 (Cal. 1985); Milkovich v. Saari, 2o3 N.W.2d 40
(Minn. 1973); Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972); Babcock v. Jackson, 191
N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 14 N.E.2d 798 (N.Y.
1938). None discussed international law or the Restatement, with the arguable exception of
Wong which relied on a theory of international comity. See Wong, 702 P.2d at 575-76; cf.
Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 227 N.E.2d 851, 858 (N.Y.) (referring to "private inter-
national law," a term synonymous with choice to law), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 923 (1967).
9 See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 8o6-i4 (1985); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 326-31 (198i).
10 See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 407-08 (1930).
11 For examples of federal extraterritoriality cases raising international law arguments or
relying on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
571, 578 (1953); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952); and Vermilya-Brown
Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 385 n.8 (1948). International law is relevant in such cases
because, when Congress has not expressly provided territorial reach, it is presumed to legislate
in accordance with international law. See Lea Brilmayer, International Law in American Courts:
A Modest Proposal, 1co YALE L.J. 2277, 2282 & n.16 (1991) [hereinafter Brilmayer, A Modest
Proposal].
12 Federal extraterritoriality cases sometimes mention the Constitution as an aside, seemingly
indicating that the Constitution limits federal legislative power. See, e.g., Lauritzen, 345 U.S.
at 579 n.7; United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (stating
that "the only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the liability, and whether
our own Constitution permitted it to do so"); see also Brilmayer, Appraisal, supra note 3, at 24-
25 (citing cases). Few cases seriously discuss the constitutional question, and none invalidate
application of federal law on these grounds. We examined a number of the leading federal
extraterritoriality cases, mostly at the Supreme Court level. None of these cases treat due
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enormously important for one simple reason: international law argu-
ments are defeated by a clear showing of Congressional intent.' 3
Constitutional law arguments, in contrast, trump contrary legislative
preferences. Thus, a defendant faced with state legislative overreach-
ing apparently has an arrow in his quiver that a defendant faced with
federal legislative overreaching lacks. This is true even though the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are
identical in language and, on their face, would seem to have an
identical substantive scope.
This puzzle becomes even more mystifying when one adds a third
hypothetical defendant. Assume this third defendant faced with fed-
eral overreaching believes that he is not properly subject to personal
jurisdiction in the American forum. In this situation, the case law
seems to indicate that the defendant can raise a Fifth Amendment
due process argument.14 Few cases admittedly deal with this issue,
primarily because most assertions of jurisdiction in federal cases are
measured by state long-arm statutes. In such cases, the relevant
standard is therefore derived from Fourteenth Amendment limits on
the actions of states.' 5 In the few cases applying federal long-arm
statutes, however, there is a general assumption that Fifth Amend-
ment due process limitations apply. 16 It also seems (although the
process as a serious issue. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., iii S. Ct. 1227 (1991);
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 571; Foley Bros. Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281 (1949); Vermilya-Brown,
335 U.S. at 77.
In addition, more detailed research into lower court cases in particular substantive areas,
see infra Part II, disclosed very few discussions of due process. The cases that do mention the
Constitution generally equate its limitations with those based on international law. See, e.g.,
United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 493-94 (9 th Cir. 1987); Rocha v. United States, 288
F.2d 545, 549 & n.4 (9th Cir. 1961); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 215-16 (N.D.
Cal. i981). Several cases specifically deny that constitutional limits exist on extraterritorial
application of American penal laws. See Chua Han Mow v. United States, 73o F.2d 1308,
1311 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1031 (1985); United States v. Baker, 6o9 F.2d 134,
136 (5th Cir. 198o); United States v. King, 552 F.2d 833, 850 (9 th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 966 (1977). We only found one case that clearly differentiated between international and
constitutional law, and that took constitutional limitations seriously. See United States v. Davis,
9o5 F.2d 245, 248-49 & n.2 (9 th Cir. 199o), cert. denied, iii S. Ct. 753 (1991).
13 See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., Omni Capital Int'l v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1987) (arguably
assuming, but not directly holding, that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause limits federal
court jurisdiction in the international context). Lower courts have consistently held that federal
long-arm statutes must be tested against the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Go-Video, Inc. v.
Akai Elec. Co., 885 F.2d 14o6, 1413-17 (9 th Cir. 1989); Paulson Inv. Co. v. Norbay Sec., Inc.,
603 F. Supp. 615, 617-18 (D. Or. 1984).
Is If Congress fails to supply a federal long-arm statute, a federal court must apply the long-
arm statute of the state in which it sits. See Omni Capital, 484 U.S. at io5.
16 See supra note 14. Federal long-arm statutes are specified in a number of substantive
federal statutes. See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ I3a-I, -2(4), i8(b) (1988);
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1988); Sherman Act, I5 U.S.C. § 5 (1988). See generally Howard
M. Erichson, Note, Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in All Federal Question Cases: A New
[Vol. 105:121 71220
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authority is rather thin) that international law limits federal long-arm
statutes, at least if Congress has not been specific about its intent to
override it.17 International law, however, has not been recognized as
a limitation on state long-arm statutes.1 S
This rather confusing pattern of results is illustrated in Figure i.
Extraterritorial application of federal substantive law has not typically
been subjected to due process scrutiny, yet the opposite is true of
extraterritorial exertions of state substantive law and of both state and
federal judicial authority. International law is used to help interpret
(but not to override) federal law and federal long-arm statutes, but
not the laws or long-arm statutes of the states. Further, nowhere is
there any judicial acknowledgment that this odd pattern exists, much
less any attempt to rationalize it.19
Rule 4, 64 N.Y.U. L. RFv. 1117, 1123 n.30 (1989) (listing federal statutes that authorize
nationwide service of process).
17 Section 421 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law describes the limits
international law places on federal long-arm statutes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAw § 421 (1987). The current relevance of this provision is unclear, because
explicit Congressional standards would override international law. See supra note 3.
18 Section 421 does purport to apply to exercises of state long-arm power internationally.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 421 cmt. f (1987). However, the
application of state long-arm statutes has not traditionally been scrutinized for consistency with
international law. See, e.g., Afram Export Corp. v. Metallurgiki Halyps, S.A., 772 F.2d 1358,
1362 (7th Cir. 1985) (noting that the defendant did not make an international law argument).
Although an exhaustive search of state long-arm cases is not possible, a computer search on the
Westlaw "all states" database (state court cases dated after 1944) was conducted. A request was
made for all state court opinions that mentioned both "long-arm" and "international law." Fifteen
cases were retrieved, but none of them used international law to invalidate the assertion of state
court jurisdiction. However, foreign states and their agents have invoked the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1602-1611 (1988), to foreclose jurisdiction in United
States courts. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Merchants Bank of N.Y., 490 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (App.
Div. 1985); Raji v. Bank Sepah-Iran, 495 N.Y.S.2d 576, 579-81 (Sup. Ct. 1985); Tucker v.
Whitaker Travel, Ltd., 5Ol A.2d 643, 644 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
Prominent international cases assess the constitutionality of state long-arm statutes. See
Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-16 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales
de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 413-18 (1984). In both cases, the Supreme Court invalidated
exercises of state long-arm power, but did not rely on international law. Asahi briefly suggested
that international cases might require different treatment than domestic ones, see Asahi, 480
U.S. at 115, but this suggestion largely rested on potential for conflict between state law and
the federal foreign affairs power.
The failure to apply international law in state long-arm cases that cross international borders
is particularly puzzling because international law has the status of feleral common law, and
could, for this reason, override contrary state law. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 111-112
(1987).
19 The Restatements rationalize their different treatment of state and federal cases by differ-
entiating between "private" international law, which is covered by the conflicts restatement, see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 cmt. d (1971), and "public" international
law, which is covered by the Foreign Relations Restatement, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 101 cmt. c (1987). The distinction is far from clear, for both
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The problem is not merely academic. Serious practical questions
are raised by the extraterritorial application of American federal stat-
utes. In one case discussed below, a Colombian national was prose-
cuted under American law for the attempted murder of two American
drug agents in Colombia and for the theft of their American pass-
ports. 20 Although the Eleventh Circuit arguably may have correctly
decided that the prosecution was consistent with international law,2 1
it made no effort to square its holding with the United States Consti-
tution. Similarly, persons acting outside the United States have been
charged with murder of a member of Congress 22 and theft of United
States government property, 23 and noncitizens acting outside the
United States have been prosecuted for attempting to commit immi-
Restatements address issues of judicial and legislative (or choice of law) jurisdiction as well as
civil and governmental judgment enforcement actions. Moreover, it is unclear why issues such
as antitrust and securities regulation are any more "public" than torts, contracts, family law,
and corporations questions that are covered by the conflicts restatements. The real difference
seems to be that the conflicts restatement involves conflicts of state laws while the foreign
relations restatement involves conflicts of federal law. However, a radical difference in treatment
on this ground is hard to defend.
20 See United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1137 (1985).
21 See infra p. 1255.
22 See United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 214-16 (N.D. Cal. 198i).
23 See United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744, 747-49 (9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 41 U.S. 936
(1973).
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gration fraud. 24 These cases, and others examined below, demonstrate
the need for Fifth Amendment scrutiny.
Because it has already received a great deal of academic attention,
the extraterritorial reach of American commercial legislation, partic-
ularly the antitrust and securities laws, will only be addressed in
passing. 25 We will focus instead on the application of civil and crim-
inal RICO, 26 as well as the application of federal drug laws. 27 Each
of these examples includes cases with politically prominent defendants:
the Marcos family in the first case and General Manuel Noriega in
the second. A final example is of comparable political importance,
for it concerns so-called universal jurisdiction over terrorists and air-
line hijackers - jurisdiction that is not founded upon any connection
between the defendant's activities and the forum. 28
As these examples demonstrate, extraterritorial application of
American law has become a potent tool for effectuating American
foreign policy. The increasingly unilateral and aggressive character
of United States foreign policy should heighten concern about the
application of American law to foreign defendants. During the I96os
and 1970s other nations and their citizens primarily feared overly
aggressive regulation of their commercial interests by the American
antitrust and securities laws. 29 Today government priorities are dif-
ferent. Our courts are used to protect professed national security
interests through application of American drug and terrorism laws.
Whether this is a proper role for our judicial system is an open
question. But if courts are to become involved, they must do so in a
manner consistent with the Constitution.
Before addressing these concrete instances of extraterritoriality,
however, it is necessary to build the case for applying the Constitution
to limit the extraterritorial application of American federal law. It is
our thesis that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause limits federal
actions in much the same manner that the Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process Clause limits state actions. Although no Supreme Court
case explicitly discusses and adopts this proposition, little or no au-
thority exists to the contrary. When the Supreme Court finally does
address this question, we believe the proper answer is clear: the Fifth
Amendment limits extraterritorial application of substantive federal
law.
24 See Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 546 (9th Cir. 1968).
25 For a fuller discussion, see Symposium, Extraterritoriality of Economic Legislation, So
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at i, 187-250.
26 See infra pp. 1246-49.
27 See infra pp. 1254-6o.
28 See infra pp. 1249-54.
29 Economic legislation is still more likely to receive extraterritorial application than is
antidiscrimination legislation. See Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct
and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 6oo & n.9 (899o).
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II. STATE AND FEDERAL EXTRATERRITORIALITY CONTRASTED
A brief word on terminology may be useful. A case's facts may
implicate only a single state (intrastate), may cross state borders within
the United States (interstate), or may cross national borders (interna-
tional). If the case is international, a conflict may arise between the
laws of a state and a foreign nation or between federal law and the
law of a foreign nation. Both of these are problems of "legislative
jurisdiction," as choice of law is sometimes called. The former we
denominate issues of state international extraterritoriality (or state
international choice of law) and the latter we term federal extraterri-
toriality (or federal choice of law). Both types of cases can be brought
in either federal or state court. Thus, to describe a case as presenting
a problem of federal extraterritoriality does not (as we use the term)
indicate anything about the forum in which it is litigated.
Questions surrounding the propriety of the forum implicate issues
of personal jurisdiction rather than legislative extraterritoriality.
When personal jurisdiction is based on a state long-arm statute, the
issue is one of state international personal jurisdiction. Federal inter-
national personal jurisdiction refers to the scope of federal long-arm
statutes. When a case is brought in federal court but jurisdiction is
based on a state long-arm statute, we refer to it as involving state
international personal jurisdiction.
To the uninitiated, it might seem that issues of state and federal
extraterritoriality should be treated substantially the same. 30 The
decision to apply the law of one sister state rather than that of another
does not appear noticeably different from the decision to apply the
law of one nation rather than that of another or from the choice
between applying sister state and foreign law. However, state inter-
national extraterritoriality cases are treated identically to state inter-
state extraterritoriality cases and differently from federal extraterrito-
riality cases. This pattern is illustrated in Figure 2.
A. Doctrinal Evolution
i. A History of Extraterritoriality Doctrine and Theory. - State
and federal extraterritoriality doctrines were not so different at their
inception. Early choice of law theory was something of an undiffer-
entiated mass, with federal and state choice of law cases relying
indiscriminately on one another and on constitutional law, interna-
30 The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law supports this intuition in some places. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 reporters' note 5 (1987) (noting that
the same principles govern state and federal extraterritoriality, except in the case of federal
preemption under the foreign affairs power). But see supra note 19 (noting that private and
public law issues should be treated differently).
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tional law, natural law, and raw untutored reason. 31 The chief
inspiration consisted of the writing of a number of territorialist schol-
ars: Ulrich Huber, Joseph Story, and Joseph Beale. 32 Under the
territorialist theory, a sovereign's power was limited to activities oc-
curring within its territory. Other states were supposed to enforce the
rights that "vested" under the law of the place where the cause of
action accrued. 33 In the first quarter of this century, choice of law
cases often referred to this so-called obligatio or "vested rights" the-
31 See, e.g., American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (I9o9) (relying
on reasoning about national sovereignty and citing a state law decision in ruling upon a federal
extraterritoriality case); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (relying on
obligatio reasoning in a review of a state choice of law case without referring to constitutional
provisions); Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 666, 669 (1892) (deciding whether to accord
full faith and credit by reference to international law and citing Blackstone on the choice of
law question).
32 See, e.g., Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 363-64 & n.2 (1939); Crapo v. Kelly, 83
U.S. (x6 Wall.) 61o, 628, 643 (1873). For an intellectual history of choice of law, see generally
Friedrich K. Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER L. REV. 419 (1984), which discusses choice
of law from antiquity to Pasquale Stanislao Mancini in the nineteenth century.
33 For a general description of the vested rights theory, see LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF
LAwVS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS § 1.2, at 18-22 (i99o) [hereinafter BRILMAYER,
FOUNDATIONS].
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ory.34 Oliver Wendell Holmes, for instance, was a proponent of the
obligatio theory of choice of law, applying it in both state and federal
extraterritoriality cases. 35
The territorial theory had its most prolonged and important impact
on state choice of law cases, perhaps because Joseph Beale (the fore-
most intellectual proponent of the theory) was the reporter for the
American Law Institute's Restatement (First) of the Conflict of Laws. 36
Partly because of the prominence of the Restatement, criticism of the
vested rights theory centered on its application to state choice of law.
Despite the intellectual attack coming from members of the legal
realist school of jurisprudence, 37 several prominent Supreme Court
cases of the period seemed to adopt the vested rights approach as
constitutional dogma, as Beale had urged.38 This period was, of
course, the heyday of substantive due process, 39 and the Due Process
Clause was the primary constitutional tool used in invalidating state
choice of law decisions. 40
During this period, most choice of law cases involved interstate
issues. This is not surprising, because interstate trade was more
common than international trade. International cases involving either
state or federal laws were rare, and few federal regulatory statutes
existed. Choice of law litigation was largely state law choice of law
litigation. Constitutional limits on choice of law thus meant consti-
tutional limits on state choice of law.
The attacks of the legal realists finally bore fruit in the I96os,
when Brainerd Currie developed a competing theory to Beale's vested
rights doctrine: the interest analysis approach to choice of law.41
Interestingly, Currie believed that his approach was equally pertinent
to state and federal choice of law issues, although his most commonly
read essays dealt with state choice of law.42 His influence was pri-
34 See, e.g., New York Central R.R. v. Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 32 (1925); Old Dominion
S.S. Co. v. Gilmore, 207 U.S. 398, 405-o6 (1907); Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 453-54 (1904).
35 See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542, 547 (,914); Slater, 194 U.S.
at 126; see also American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (iog) (citing
Slater and relying on territorialist theory).
36 For a discussion of Beale and the reaction to his writings, see LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE, 1927-I960, at 25-26 (1986).
37 See, e.g., id. at 25-28; BRILMAYER, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 33, § 1.3, at 22-37.
38 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 149-
50 (1934); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209, 213-14 (1922); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 373-74 (i918).
39 See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64-65 (19o5).
40 See, e.g., Hartford Accident, 292 U.S. at 148-50 (1934); Dodge, 246 U.S. at 373-77 (1918).
41 See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) [hereinafter
CURRIE EssAys] (collecting most of Currie's articles).
42 One of Currie's less frequently read essays dealt with Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), and Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). See
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marily felt by state judges in formulating state choice of law doctrine,
particularly in a few key states such as California and New York.
43
Adoption of his methods led states to apply their laws far more
expansively to cases having progressively fewer, and more attenuated,
connections with the forum.
State choice of law cases carried forward their reliance on due
process analysis (with an occasional reference to the Full Faith and
Credit Clause44), but in responding first to the legal realists' attack
and then to Currie's interest analysis approach, judges began to turn
away from the fundamentalism of vested rights. Increasingly, the
cases asked whether there were "contacts" between the forum and the
controversy, whether application of local law was "fair," and whether
the state had an "interest" in having its law applied. 45 Most of these
cases involved interstate conflicts rather than international ones, es-
pecially at the Supreme Court level, although there were occasional
exceptions. 4 6 This probably reflected the interstate, as opposed to
international, character of most commercial litigation. Constitutional
limits still meant limits on state choice of law.
The increasing importance of federal choice of law is traceable to
the increasing adoption of federal regulation. The modern era of
federal extraterritoriality dates from United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America (ALCOA), 4 7 which abandoned the restrictive vested rights
approach of the turn-of-the-century cases. 48 ALCOA itself involved
the antitrust laws, while other cases involved the reach of copyright
BRAINERD CURRIE, The Silver Oar and All That: A Study of the Romero Case, in CURIE
ESSAYS, supra note 41, at 361, 361. He believed that these cases should be resolved under his
state law theory. See id. at 366-67.
43 See, e.g., Reich v. Purcell, 432 P.2d 727, 729-31 (Cal. x967) (renouncing the "place of
wrong" rule and assessing the "interests" of the various states and private parties); Babcock v.
Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 284-85 (N.Y. x963) (assessing the competing "interests" and "policies"
of New York and Ontario).
44 See infra note 70.
45 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (198i) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he
Court has invalidated the choice of law of a State which has had no significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, with the parties and with the occur-
rence of the transaction."); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S.
493, 502-03 (1939) (weighing competing interests of two states); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus-
trial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1935) (same). For further discussion, see infra
pp. 1240-44.
46 Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), was the last major Supreme Court state
international choice of law case. But cf. Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner, 423 U.S. 3
(1975) (per curiam) (dealing with applicability of state choice of law rules in an international
case brought in federal court).
47 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
48 See id. at 443-44.
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protection, 49 the Fair Labor Standards Act,5 0 and the Jones Act.5 '
These cases pursued a common methodology, as in each the Court
perceived the key question as one of statutory construction: should
the statute be interpreted to apply extraterritorially?5 2 International
law might aid in construing the statute, for Congress was presumed
to act in accordance with international law.5 3 However, Congress
could contravene international law if it clearly expressed its intent to
do so. Current cases use this methodology to interpret the reach of
securities and commodities laws5 4 and civil rights legislation.
55
2. Why Did State and Federal Choice of Law Develop Differently?
- The state choice of law revolution, then being fought out in the
law reviews and in the courts, had virtually no impact on the devel-
opment of federal choice of law.5 6 The critical question is why. In
49 See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1956).
50 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988); see Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 389-90
(1948).
51 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1988); see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 584-86 (1953).
52 See Brilmayer, Appraisal, supra note 3, at 14-15.
53 See id. at 15.
54 See, e.g., Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 2041, 1047-48 (2d Cir. 1983) (applying
the Commodities Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988)); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519
F.2d 974, 985-86 (2d Cir.) (applying securities laws), cert. denied, 423 U.S. io18 (1975). See
generally Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 H~Av. L. REv.
553 (1976) (discussing extraterritorial application of the securities laws).
55 Most recently, this involved title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooa-
2oooh(6) (1988). See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., III S. Ct. 1227, 1234-36 (2992) (holding
that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, title VII is not subject to extraterritorial application).
56 References in modern extraterritoriality cases to state choice of law are few and far
between. We examined thirteen leading cases in federal extraterritoriality since ALCOA was
decided and looked for evidence of the influence of state choice of law doctrine or theory. A
number of cases did not mention state choice of law. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de
Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. io (1963); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 282 (1949);
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Tamari v.
Bache & Co., 730 F.2d 1103 (7 th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); Psimenos, 722 F.2d
at 2042; Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
However, several cases made some passing mention of state choice of law. See Hellenic
Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 313 n.I, 314 n.2, 315 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 358 (1958); Steele v. Bulova
Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 286, 292 (1956); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 579 n.7, 583 nn.
13-14, 591 & n.27 (2953); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 n.2 (1948); Laker
Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airways, 731 F.2d 909, 922 n.26, 952 nn. 170-71
(D.C. Cir. 1984); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597, 613 & n.29 (9th
Cir. 2976).
The results in none of the cases surveyed turned in whole or even in part on reliance on a
state choice of law analogy. None discuss "modern" choice of law theory such as interest
analysis or the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (some, of course, were decided prior
to its publication). The allusions to state choice of law are peripheral in the extreme. At the
time that many of these civil actions were resolved, state choice of law was undergoing a
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both areas the courts were breaking away from the old-fashioned
vested rights dogma of Holmes and Beale, but they did so in different
ways.5 7 In the state law arena, judges relied upon a vigorous aca-
demic literature concerning the nature of the choice of law process
and decided that states should disregard territorial limitations to fur-
ther local interests (defined in terms of providing the benefits of local
laws to locals).58 In contrast, courts deciding federal choice of law
issues looked to international law and to legislative history, and chose
to emphasize that statutes are normally designed to apply only to
activities or harms occurring within the sovereign's territory.
59
Most recently, for instance, the Supreme Court interpreted the
reach of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196460 and held that it
did not apply to the claim of an American employee who alleged
discrimination while he was working for an American employer in
Saudi Arabia. 61 The Court treated the question as one of statutory
construction, applying a presumption that, unless Congress provides
to the contrary, it intends to limit the reach of statutes to the territory
of the United States. 62 If the issue were one of "modern" state choice
of law, it seems unlikely that extraterritorial application would have
been denied. The United States would have had an interest in pro-
veritable revolution, which is never mentioned in these cases. Instead, they rely on international
law and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law. See supra note 12.
This may change to some extent, for the newest Restatement of Foreign Relations Law itself
uses a "reasonableness" test that purports to be influenced by the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws. See generally Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena:
Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL
DE COURS: COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMiY OF INT'L LAv 311, 360-63 (979)
(arguing for the adoption of a modern choice of law theory).
S7 One possible explanation might be that federal extraterritoriality involves conflicts between
coequal sovereigns, while state international choice of law involves a choice between the law of
one sovereign and a subdivision of another. This difference, however, wouid not explain why
the states of the United States are more aggressive in applying their law than the federal
government is. For a criticism of the Supreme Court's lack of attention to modern choice of
law theory in federal extraterritoriality cases, see Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterri-
torial Application of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. (forthcoming 1992) (manuscript at 34-
35, 41, on file at the Harvard Law School Library).
58 See BRAIMRD CURRIE, Survival of Actions: Adjudications Versus Automation in the
Conflict of Laws, in CURIE ESSAYS, supra note 41, at 128, 144-45. For example, California
has an interest when an injured party who would benefit from application of California law is
a Californian. On this phenomenon generally, see John H. Ely, Choice of Law and the State's
Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 Was. & MARY L. REv. 173, 173-80, 211-17 (981).
59 See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., III S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (199) (discussing the
presumption that Congress usually intends to regulate only within United States territory); see
also Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284-85 (1949) (noting the presumption that Congress
intends laws to apply "only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States").
60 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooa-2oooh(6) (1988).
61 See Arabian Am. Oil, III S. Ct. at 1235-36 (iggi).
62 See id. at 1230.
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tecting the American plaintiff, and Saudi Arabia would have had no
interest in application of its law because the defendant was not Saudi
Arabian.63 Modern theory denies that state legislatures would prefer
that their statutes be limited to local occurrences. 64
The state courts' rejection of interpretive presumptions against
extraterritoriality and their application of forum law largely accounts
for the fact that constitutional issues were pressed in cases involving
state but not federal extraterritoriality. The perception of overreach-
ing may have lead to a search for means to restrain the states, and
the Due Process Clause was the tool closest at hand. This is not to
say that defendants prevailed in most of these constitutional argu-
ments; to the contrary, the Supreme Court increasingly allowed states
to apply their laws to cases with demonstrably attenuated connec-
tions. 65 However, what is significant is that constitutional arguments
were invoked at all, considering their absence in similar federal choice
of law cases.
Although several other possible explanations might arguably ac-
count for the peculiar divide between federal and state choice of law
theory, few have much appeal. One potential explanation posits that
courts have misunderstood the analogy between the interstate and
international contexts. If the choice between applying New York and
Connecticut law is analogous to the choice between applying the laws
of the United States and France, then one might also view the Con-
stitution as playing the same role in the interstate case as is played
by international law in the international context. This analogy is
based on the notion that the Constitution exists outside of and above
the laws of the two states - it provides a neutral frame of reference
for choosing between the two. Similarly, international law can be
viewed as outside of (and arguably above) the laws of the two nations
and thus operating neutrally between them.
This analogy may be fine so far as it goes, but it only goes so far.
Specifically, it is misleading because it implies exclusivity - that
constitutional law is the only appropriate device for limiting state
choice of law, and that international law is the only vehicle for limiting
federal choice of law. In fact, international law might also apply to
state international choice of law issues, and the Constitution might
63 For an explanation of "false conflicts" and why these occur in common domicile cases, see
BRILMAYER, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 33, § 2.1.2, at 58; and Ely, supra note 58, at 2o6-07.
64 See Kramer, supra note 57 (manuscript at 37-38). Brainerd Currie asserted, for instance,
that legislatures were exceedingly unlikely to specify that their laws should be applied only to
local activities. See BRAINERD CURRIE, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-
Laws Method, in CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note 41, at 77, 116. He also claimed that it is irrational
to the point of unconstitutionality to resolve choice of law cases on the basis of where the wrong
occurred. See BRAINERD CURRIE, The Constitution and the "Transitory" Cause of Action, in
CURRIE ESSAYS, supra note 41, at 283, 306.
65 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-20 (198I).
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also apply to federal choice of law. International law should apply to
state choice of law because international law has the status of federal
law, either as statutory law (if the international law stems from a
treaty) or as federal common law (if the international law stems from
the sovereign's practice). 66 Constitutional law should apply to federal
choice of law for the same reason that it applies to all other exercises
of federal power. 67 The Fifth Amendment's Due Process clause has
as much relevance to choice of law issues as it does to domestic
exercises of federal authority63 and to other international exercises of
federal power such as the assertion of adjudicative jurisdiction.
6 9
A second potential explanation for the divide between federal and
state choice of law theories lies in the wording of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. 70 At first glance, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
might appear to account for differences between state and federal
choice of law because the clause requires deference to the laws of
other states but not to the laws of foreign nations.7 1 For this reason,
courts may base a choice between federal and foreign law on different
grounds than a choice between the laws of several states. Thus,
international choice of law might be expected to develop differently
from interstate choice of law. The problems with this explanation
however, are evident. The critical question is why federal choice of
law is different from state choice of law, yet the above explanation
answers a separate question: why international choice of law is dif-
ferent from interstate choice of law. Numerous state choice of law
decisions concern international questions, such as when Texas must
decide to apply its own law or Mexican law.
72
66 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ I 11-112 (1987).
67 The Restatement apparently agrees, although it does not focus much on the problem.
See, e.g., id. § 402 cmt. j.
62 See infra pp. 1234-37.
69 For cases applying due process scrutiny to federal long-arm power, see supra note 14. Cf.
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 209 (i958) (holding that the Fifth Amendment would be implicated if the United
States required a party to commit acts that would subject him or her to criminal prosecution
in another nation).
70 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § i ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State . . . ").
71 See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410-xI (1930).
72 See id. at 405-12. It would probably make more sense to differentiate between interstate
and international choice of law than between federal and state choice of law. It seems possible
that international problems (which involve competing sovereign states and very different sets of
laws) might involve different considerations than interstate ones. If such differentiation were
made, the Full Faith and Credit Clause might provide one doctrinal explanation. But this is
not the way that the line has been drawn. As we have noted, state choice of law doctrine takes
little account of whether the problem is interstate or international. Furthermore, it is not clear
that the applicability of the clause even makes much of a difference, because the Supreme Court
has consistently held that the Full Faith and Credit and Due Process Clauses play identical
roles. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.Io (i98I); see also Sun Oil Co. v.
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A final potential explanation for the distinction between federal
and state choice of law regimes lies in the structure of federal court
jurisdiction. Federal choice of law takes a unilateral approach to
jurisdiction, whereas state choice of law takes a multilateral ap-
proach. 73 The unilateral approach means that, in deciding whether
to apply federal law, a court looks only at the federal law in deciding
whether or not it is applicable. If it is not applicable, the case is
dismissed. In contrast, courts approach state choice of law issues
multilaterally - by comparing the two competing laws, and deciding
which of the two to apply. For example, if a court decides a federal
law case in which the facts reveal contacts with both the United States
and France, it can only apply American law. If the contacts with the
United States are too attenuated for American law to apply, the case
is dismissed. But if a court must decide a state law case with contacts
with both New York and France, it can apply the law of either
jurisdiction. If the contacts with New York are too attenuated for
that state's law to apply, the court will resolve the case under French
law.
The connection between the unilateral/multilateral dichotomy and
federal court jurisdiction is that federal courts are courts of limited
jurisdiction, which (for our purposes) requires that a basis for federal
jurisdiction exist, such as the presence of a federal question. 74 One
might think that choice of law is linked to the existence of federal
question jurisdiction - once it is determined that federal law does
not apply, federal question jurisdiction is similarly nonexistent and
the case must be dismissed. Hence, the unilateral nature of federal
choice of law: there is no point in considering application of French
law. Whether this explanation could account for the lack of consti-
tutional oversight of federal extraterritoriality is far from clear. But
this question need not be pursued at length because it collapses under
its own weight.
The reason is that the difference we are seeking to explain - the
difference in treatment between the federal and state choice of law
regimes - does not correspond neatly to the difference between cases
heard in federal court and cases heard in state court. There is a
statistical correlation, of course, because federal court jurisdiction
Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 730 n.3 (1988) (noting that the Court's discussion of the due process
choice of law claim "[could] be brief" because the Full Faith and Credit Clause claim had
already been discussed). Because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly
applies to international state choice of law cases, see, e.g., Home Ins. Co., 281 U.S. at 407-1o,
the interstate/international dichotomy is presently devoid of practical significance. The great
divide, instead, lies between state and federal extraterritoriality.
73 See generally BRILMAYER, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 33, § 1.1.2, at 16-17 (discussing
multilateral and unilateral approaches to conflict of laws).
74 This explanation was put forward in Brilmayer, Appraisal, supra note 3, at 13. For
reasons that appear in the text below, we have now concluded that it is wrong.
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turns in part on whether the cause of action arises under federal law.
A case is more likely to be brought in federal court if it is based on
a federal cause of action than if it is not. But federal law cases may
also be brought in state court, as long as the federal statute does not
grant the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. Any explanation based
entirely on the limited nature of federal court subject matter jurisdic-
tion fails to explain why state courts also use different choice of law
methods to resolve conflicts between state and foreign laws than they
use to resolve conflicts between federal and foreign laws.
75
The best explanation for the failure to consider the Fifth Amend-
ment's limit on federal choice of law may simply be intellectual over-
sight.76 In some cases the constitutional issue could easily be avoided
because a modest interpretation of a statute would accomplish the
same goal. But this technique leaves open the question of what to do
when the statute itself is written in territorially aggressive terms. At
a minimum, an analogy to constitutional limits on state choice of law
would seem to create a prima facie case for applying due process
limits to federal choice of law. Having raised the issue, it is nonethe-
less possible that some relevant difference exists between overreaching
by states and overreaching by the federal government, leading to the
conclusion that the Constitution should limit one but not the other.
Perhaps there is a good reason for treating the two situations differ-
ently. This question merits closer attention.
B. State and Federal Choice of Law Distinguished
Several possible justifications exist for not applying due process
limits on state choice of law to federal choice of law. The first is
based on the arguments advanced in the recent Supreme Court case
75 See, e.g., Miller v. Phillips Petroleum Co. Nor., 537 A.2d 19o, 195-201 (Del. x988).
76 The academic literature contains few discussions of whether the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause limits federal extraterritoriality. But see Brilmayer, Appraisal, supra note 3, at
27-35 (noting that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause is "the most obvious source of
limitation" on the extraterritorial application of American law). In response to this last sugges-
tion, Professor Fritz Juenger has claimed that the Supreme Court should not review federal
extraterritoriality on constitutional grounds because it has mishandled the review of state extra-
territoriality. See Friedrich K. Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?: A Com-
inent on Professor Brilmayer's Appraisal, 5o LAW & CONTEIP. PROBS., Summer 1987, at 39,
42-43.
Professor Andreas Lowenfeld has written what is probably the best article on the impact of
the Constitution on extraterritoriality. See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, U.S. Law Enforcement
Abroad: The Constitution and International Law, 83 Am. J. INT'L L. 88o (1989). He argues
that the Constitution requires our courts to adhere to international law in extraterritoriality
cases. See id. at 881-84. This argument is different from ours in two respects. First, our
argument applies regardless of whether international law limits exist on extraterritoriality. Sec-
ond, Lowenfeld does not rely (at least not explicitly) on either the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause or the analogy to Fourteenth Amendment limits on state choice of law.
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of United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,77 which limited the extraterri-
torial impact of the Constitution, and indicates that the Constitution
does not provide protection for aliens who act outside of our borders.
The second is based on the federal government's broad foreign affairs
powers, which might be thought more extensive than state powers in
either the domestic or the international context, and implies that due
process protections may be subordinated to considerations of national
security. Although seemingly related, the two arguments are distinct
because some extraterritoriality cases raise no national security prob-
lems. 78 Conversely, national security concerns are not limited to the
actions of aliens taken abroad, for domestic cases can also have na-
tional security overtones. 79 We argue below that neither of these
considerations warrants insulating federal extraterritoriality from due
process review.
z. The Verdugo Opinion - Verdugo involved the American pros-
ecution of a suspected murderer of a United States drug agent. The
Mexican police took the suspect into custody in Mexico and handed
him over to American authorities at the border.80 Acting without a
warrant, the American and Mexican police then jointly searched the
suspect's home in Mexico while he remained in custody in the United
States.8 ' The issue facing the Supreme Court was whether the Fourth
Amendment applied to the search. The Court held that it did not.8 2
Verdugo is potentially pertinent to the question whether the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause limits the extraterritorial reach of
federal statutes.8 3 As in Verdugo, defendants raising Fifth Amend-
ment extraterritoriality claims are not likely to be American citizens.
Furthermore, such defendants would be asking a court to give extra-
territorial reach to the Fifth Amendment, just as Verdugo asked the
Supreme Court to give extraterritorial application to the Fourth
Amendment.
Several factors, however, militate against carrying over the holding
in Verdugo to the Fifth Amendment context. One might argue that
" 494 U.S. 259 (I990).
78 For example, most garden-variety private law suits involve no such issues.
79 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (197) (per curiam)
(the Pentagon Papers case).
80 See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 262.
81 See id.
82 See id. at 261.
83 For a general discussion of the Verdugo opinion, see Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Consti-
tution?, ioo YALE L.J. 909, 971-76 (i9i). At one point, the Court seemed to address the
constitutional issue directly, and wrote "we have rejected the claim that aliens are entitled to
Fifth Amendment rights outside the sovereign territory of the United States." Verdugo, 494
U.S. at 269. The Court was discussing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (195o), in which
the Court held that enemy aliens captured in China and held in Germany after World War II
could not seek writs of habeas corpus in American federal courts. See id. at 777-81.
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enforcing due process limits on the extraterritorial application of a
federal statute does not give extraterritorial reach to the Constitution.
Arguably, the relevant government action in Verdugo (the search)
occurred in another nation, whereas in Fifth Amendment extraterri-
toriality cases the relevant government action (the application of
American law during the course of the litigation) would occur in the
United States.8 4 Because limits on choice of law would only constrain
courts within the United States, according to this argument, the ap-
plication of the Fifth Amendment would not entail any extraterritorial
application of the Constitution. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning
plunges us headfirst into a metaphysical quagmire, requiring a deter-
mination of what the relevant governmental action is and where it
occurs. Does "application" of the law occur at the time of primary
conduct or at the point when the court renders a judgment based on
the law?8 5 It is hardly helpful to talk about the problem in these
terms.
One might claim with some force, on the other hand, that in a
constitutional government of limited powers, a statute cannot have a
broader reach than the Constitution that provides its basis. If federal
laws are applicable extraterritorially any time that Congress explicitly
so states, they can presumably be applied regardless of the lack of
connection between a controversy and the United States. In contrast,
the Constitution's reach would be limited to government activities
occurring within our territorial boundaries. Although this result ad-
mittedly seems peculiar, the Verdugo Court seemed quite happy to
live with the paradox. It acknowledged that Verdugo was subject to
American drug laws for his activities outside the United States even
though he could not invoke protections afforded by the Due Process
Clause.8 6 In light of Verdugo, it is not clear that the current Supreme
84 In this light, consider the Verdugo majority's attempt to distinguish the Fourth Amendment
from the Fifth Amendment prohibition on compulsory self-incrimination. See Verdugo, 494
U.S. at 264-66. The Court stated that the Fourth Amendment violation occurs at the time and
at the place where the search was conducted, whereas the Fifth Amendment violation occurs
at trial. See id. at 264.
65 It is inconsistent for a defendant to claim that the application of the Constitution occurs
in American courts, but that the application of an American statute in the same case is
extraterritorial. After all, American courts apply the statute as well as the Constitution. The
defendant may argue, however, that the statute has an extraterritorial application because it
influences the primary conduct of persons in other nations. If so, the Constitution must also
apply extraterritorially because it removes statutory impediments to primary conduct. Either
both the statute and the Constitution apply extraterritorially, or neither one applies.
One of the early debates in choice of law theory was somewhat similar: Beale spoke in terms
of rights "vesting" at the time of primary conduct, and the legal realists claimed that no rights
came into existence until the court delivered its verdict. See BRILMAYER, FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 33, § 1.2, at 19, § 1.5, at 33-36.
86 See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 269-73.
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Court would be dissuaded by the limited powers argument, whatever
the argument's merits as a matter of first impression.
The extraterritorial defendant, however, still has a convincing ba-
sis for distinguishing Verdugo from choice of law cases, for Verdugo
was a Fourth Amendment case. The Fourth Amendment is unique
in that evident difficulties exist with satisfying it in international cases,
because it is unclear to whom the police would apply for a warrant
to conduct a foreign search.8 7 Moreover, Verdugo itself relied in part
on the precise wording of the Fourth Amendment, which (unlike the
Fifth Amendment) purports to protect "the people."8 8 "The people,"
according to the Court, refers to "the American people."'8 9 Most not-
ably, the disfavored status of the exclusionary rule is no secret. 90 It
has been clear for some time that the exclusionary rule is not itself
supposed to be of constitutional stature, but merely a remedy for
constitutional violations, and the Court alluded to the remedial nature
of the rule in declaring it inapplicable extraterritorially. 91 Given that
the rule has been held inapplicable in parole hearings, 92 grand jury
proceedings, 93 and certain other governmental processes, 94 perhaps it
should not be surprising that it does not apply in Mexico.
In addition to arguments limiting Verdugo to the search and seizure
context, other reasons exist for believing it inapplicable to the reach
of the Fifth Amendment, for due process has historically limited fed-
eral action in a number of similar settings. The closest analog to
federal extraterritoriality is federal long-arm jurisdiction, which has
been subject to due process scrutiny.95 The Court has stated em-
phatically in the related context of service of process that "there has
been no question in this country of excepting foreign nationals from
the protection of our Due Process Clause." 96 It has also indicated that
due process prevents an American court from ordering conduct that
87 The Court alluded to this problem. See id. at 274 (maintaining that warrants issued by
American judges "would be a dead letter outside the United States").
88 See id. at 265. The Fifth Amendment states that "no person" may be deprived of property
without due process of law. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89 See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 265.
90 See Michael J. Flannery, Note, Abridged Too Far: Anticipatory Search Warrants and the
Fourth Amendment, 32 WAI. & MARY L. REV. 781, 796 (ig99).
91 See Verdugo, 494 U.S. at 264 (stating that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs at the
time that the evidence is seized, not when it is admitted at trial).
92 See United States v. Finney, 897 F.2d 1047, 1048 (ioth Cir. 799o).
93 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
94 See, e.g., INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050-51 (1984) (holding that evidence
gathered pursuant to an unlawful arrest is admissible in a civil deportation hearing).
95 See cases cited supra note 14.
96 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 705 (988).
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is illegal under the laws of another country. 97 These examples indicate
that due process protections are not entirely limited by our borders.
Perhaps most importantly, there is no suggestion in the Verdugo
opinion that a different result would have obtained if the extraterri-
torial search had been conducted by state rather than federal officials.
But if extraterritoriality should not turn on whether it is the state
rather than the federal government whose conduct is at issue, the
Fifth Amendment ought to limit federal choice of law, for it is well
established that the states are subject to Fourteenth Amendment due
process limits in the application of their laws to international cases. 98
If state and federal officials are to be treated equivalently for extra-
territoriality purposes, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause must
apply to federal choice of law.
This analysis of Verdugo identifies what would surely have to be
the central element in any argument that the Fifth Amendment does
not limit extraterritorial application of federal law - some basis for
distinguishing state practice in the interstate and international context
from federal practice. The argument must show why Congress may
make its laws applicable to any case whatsoever, regardless of the
case's connection with the territory of the United States, although the
states may not. Verdugo, however, offers no basis for distinguishing
state from federal power. The argument for differentiation must be
that Congress has more expansive power over transnational litigation
than the states, and the basis for this argument most plausibly lies in
federal prerogatives in the area of foreign affairs.
2. The Foreign Affairs Power. - Numerous cases have affirmed
the federal government's plenary power over foreign affairs.99 How-
ever, quick reference to the "plenary power" cases cannot resolve the
due process question because many of them involve conflicts between
federal and state power (in which federal power is undeniably supe-
rior) or conflicts between various branches of the federal govern-
ment. 100 Choice of law issues raise additional considerations - ques-
tions of fairness to persons who claim to be beyond the reach of state
power. Thus, the more relevant cases are those involving the appli-
cation of the Bill of Rights to protect international defendants from
exertions of federal power. Cases suggesting that the Bill of Rights
97 See Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 211-12 (1958).
9s See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410-I (1930).
99 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-690 (i98x); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-589, 634-655 (1952); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-329 (1936); Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434-35 (1920).
100 Cf. Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 253 (1972) (distinguishing
separation of powers problems from Bill of Rights problems for purposes of the Curtiss-Wright
case).
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does not apply to international issues typically arise in the context of
immigration.
The legislative and executive branches of the United States gov-
ernment possess practically absolute power to exclude aliens from
American territory.10 1 The exclusion power is a non-enumerated for-
eign affairs power' 0 2 that the federal government possesses as a con-
sequence of national sovereignty. 103 Nation-states have long claimed
alien exclusion as necessary for self-preservation. 1
04
As early as 1889, the Supreme Court in the Chinese Exclusion
Case'0 5 upheld severe restrictions imposed by Congress upon alien
entry. The Court later held that "[n]o limits can be put by the courts
upon the power of Congress to protect, by summary methods, the
country from the advent of aliens whose race or habits render them
undesirable as citizens."10 6 The federal government has also long
engaged in alien detention. In 1896, in the case of Wong Wing v.
United States, 10 7 the Supreme Court approved temporary alien deten-
tion. Much later, in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei'0 8
the Supreme Court declined to grant relief to an alien who had been
detained on Ellis Island for two years while immigration and natu-
ralization services sought without success to locate a country that
would accept him.
The immigration cases provide the clearest example of the Court
holding the Due Process Clause inapplicable to government proce-
dures. Professor Louis Henkin concedes (with distaste) that it is pos-
sible to read the cases as providing for no constitutional scrutiny
whatsoever. 10 9  But the potential immigrant is in a very different
position from the foreign defendant protesting the application of Amer-
ican law. The foreign defendant vulnerable to American criminal
prosecution or to large civil judgments seeks neither entrance into the
101 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) ("'[O]ver no conceivable subject is
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over' the admission of aliens." (quoting
Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (190o))).
102 The Constitution does not explicitly grant the federal government the power to control
immigration, but immigration powers have been implied from conceptions of nationhood and
sovereignty. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 6o4-2o (1889) (The Chinese
Exclusion Case).
103 See Richard F. Hahn, Note, Constitutional Limits on the Power to Exclude Aliens, 82
COLUM. L. REv. 957, 967-69 (x982).
104 See James A.R. Nafziger, The General Admission of Aliens Under International Law, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 804 (1983).
los 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
106 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896) (discussing the Chinese Exclusion
Case).
107 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
o 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
109 See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, ioo HARV. L. REv. 853, 858-63 (x987).
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United States nor any benefit under our laws. The immigrant, in
contrast, arguably wants something positive from the United States. 110
Regardless of whether one agrees that aliens should not be entitled to
due process in exclusion proceedings (a position that we decline to
endorse), extraterritoriality presents a stronger case for Fifth Amend-
ment scrutiny. The relevant position is found in Perez v. Brownell:111
"The restrictions confining Congress in the exercise of any of the
powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution apply with equal
vigor when that body seeks to regulate our relations with other na-
tions." 11
2
Choice of law cases typically implicate national security to a lesser
degree than do immigration cases. Although antitrust, intellectual
property, and title VII cases involve national interests, failure to apply
these laws to a particular dispute probably would not threaten national
security, and blanket immunity from Fifth Amendment scrutiny is
therefore inappropriate. Examined below are some extraterritoriality
cases that raise problems of national security, such as terrorism and
drug prosecutions. Yet even in these contexts, Fifth Amendment
analysis is appropriate, for the due process standard itself allows room
for legitimate considerations of national security. If constitutional
limits on federal choice of law run parallel to the analogous consti-
tutional limits on state law, the forum's interests are already ade-
quately accommodated in the due process equation.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON FEDERAL CHOICE OF LAW
Assuming that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause imposes
limits on Congress' power to mandate extraterritorial application of
federal law, what shape should these limits take? In part, the answer
to this question simply borrows from the state choice of law doctrine
and imposes comparable limits on the federal government. But it also
involves making adjustments for the ways in which federal law is
distinctive. State constitutional choice of law must be translated into
110 See Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing Shaughnessy v. United States
ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 2o6, 216 (1953)). This explanation forms the basis for the doctrinal
distinction between exclusion and deportation. See id.; see also Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power
of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HxaRv. L.
REv. 1362, 1393-96 (1953) (arguing that, despite this distinction, the general power to issue
writs of habeas corpus requires federal courts to become involved in exclusion as well as in
deportation cases).
..n 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
112 Id. at 58. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law takes a firm position that
the Bill of Rights applies to exercises of the foreign affairs power. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 721 (987). The Restatement specifically includes due process,
and for this purpose it equates Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment protections. See id. § 721
cmt. f and reporters' note 6.
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the federal context with due regard for the relevant differences be-
tween state and federal power.
A. Contacts, Interests, and Fairness
The current test for due process limitations on state choice of law
originated in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.113 Under Hague, the
state must have "significant contacts or significant aggregation of con-
tacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair. ' 114 No majority opinion was pro-
duced in Hague; the plurality and the concurrence relied on different
choice of law theories. 115 The plaintiff's decedent had been killed in
a motorcycle accident in Wisconsin. All persons involved in the ac-
cident lived in the state, and all of the vehicles were registered there.
After the accident, however, the widow moved to Minnesota and
brought suit there." 6 Application of Minnesota law was upheld in
part because of the widow's after-acquired domicile, but also because
the defendant insurance company did unrelated business in Minnesota
and because the decedent had been employed in the local state
courts. 117
Hague signalled judicial willingness to allow states extreme latitude
in applying their own laws. Indeed, one might wonder whether, after
Hague, significant constitutional limitations still exist. A subsequent
case, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, si8 indicated that constitutional
scrutiny has not been completely vitiated, but the Court offered little
help in predicting what the future limits might be. In Shutts, a lower
court judge faced with a multistate class action had held that forum
law would apply to all plaintiffs in the class, regardless of whether
their particular dispute with the defendant had any connection with
13 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
114 Id. at 312-13. The test and the case that generated it have been widely discussed. See,
e.g., David F. Cavers, Symposium: Conflict-of-Laws Theory After Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague - Introduction, io HOFSTRA L. RPv. I, 2 (i981); David P. Granoff, Comment, Legis-
lative Jurisdiction, State Policies and Post-Occurrence Contacts in Allstate Insurance Co. v.
Hague, 8i COLUM. L. REV. 1134, 1137 (ig8i); Louise Weinberg, Choice of Law and Minimal
Scrutiny, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 440, 460 (1982).
115 Justice Stevens concurred without adopting the significant contacts formulation. He
argued that, although the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not "require the forum state to
apply foreign law whenever another state has a valid interest in the litigation," the Due Process
Clause prohibits the application of forum law if it favors residents over nonresidents, is dra-
matically different from the laws in other states, or is unfair on its face or as applied. See
Hague, 449 U.S. at 322-31 (Stevens, J., concurring). These suggestions have not been adopted
in subsequent cases.
116 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 305.
117 See id. at 313-20.
11 472 U.S. 797 (1985)-
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the forum. 119 In reversing this decision, the Supreme Court held that
mere administrative convenience could not justify the application of
forum law. 120 Beyond this, however, the Court failed to indicate what
circumstances would justify the application of forum law.
Certainly, after Shutts, the mere fact that the forum state has
personal jurisdiction over the defendant is not in itself adequate to
resolve all choice of law issues. This result seems correct when the
rather attenuated factors that might establish personal jurisdiction are
considered. For example, the defendant might be subject to jurisdic-
tion simply because she was passing through the state for a few hours
and happened to be served with process.121 But what factors would
be adequate? Examining some additional cases suggests circumstances
in which application of forum law is probably appropriate. For ex-
ample, personal jurisdiction is sufficient to justify the application of
forum law to questions characterized as procedural. The precise con-
tours of this procedural category are unclear, but Justice Scalia's
opinion in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman 122 suggests that borderline cases
should be analyzed by looking at how the procedural category has
historically been drawn.1
23
It is also fairly well established that a state may regulate its
residents, even when they are acting outside of the state. In Skiriotes
v. Florida,124 the state sought to apply its law to one of its residents
who, while outside the state's territorial waters, violated a prohibition
on using scuba equipment to fish for sponges. Recognizing the power
of the states over their own citizens, the Court held that Florida could
apply its own law.125 This holding is analogous to the recognition in
personal jurisdiction cases that a state may compel its domiciliaries to
return to defend a lawsuit.126 International law similarly recognizes
the defendant's nationality as an adequate basis for application of
local law. 
12 7
Other possible bases for legislative jurisdiction are somewhat more
speculative. Hague suggests that the defendant's unrelated conduct
in the forum may support the application of forum law in combination
with other factors. 128 Sun Oil also suggests that historically recognized
119 See id. at 803.
120 See id.
121 See Burnham v. Superior Court, 1io S. Ct. 2105, 2114-15 (1990).
122 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
123 See id. at 726-29 (allowing the forum state to apply its own statute of limitations on the
grounds that the statute governs a "procedural" issue). Other issues commonly treated as
procedural for state choice of law purposes include burdens of proof, see RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONFLICT OF LAWs § 6oi (1934), and competency and credibility of witnesses, see id. § 596.
"'4 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
125 See id. at 76-77.
126 See Milliken v. Meyer, 3'1 U.S. 457, 463-64 (1940).
127 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(2) (1987).
128 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 316-18.
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bases for jurisdiction are probably constitutionally adequate. 12 9 In
both the interstate and the international contexts, commission of a
wrong within the state would likely be included - a manifestation of
the old territorialist theory of Oliver Wendell Holmes and the first
restatement of conflicts.1
30
Criminal jurisdiction is treated only slightly differently from civil
jurisdiction. 131 Fewer cases exist, suggesting perhaps that states them-
selves have been less inclined to press the limits of the Constitution
than have their individual citizens when they seek monetary judg-
ments. One such criminal case was Skiriotes v. Florida,132 which
held that a state may regulate acts of its citizens committed outside
of the state. Domicile of the victim, however, has not traditionally
been a basis for jurisdiction, except in child support or alimony
cases. 13 3 Strassheim v. Daily134 upheld a conviction based on terri-
torial impact, and stated that "[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but
intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, jus-
tify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if [the defendant]
had been present at the effect.'
135
These state choice of law cases are useful tools in assessing the
constitutionality of federal extraterritoriality. Despite its frustrating
vagueness, the three aspects of the Hague formulation should be kept
in mind: due process requires "contacts" with the forum, "interests"
arising out of these contacts, and "fairness" to the defendant.
The requirement of contacts seems straightforward: something
about the controversy or the defendant must touch the forum. Some
of these contacts may be related to the controversy. The events
leading up to the litigation, for instance, may have occurred in the
forum, or perhaps one or more of the parties to the litigation are
United States residents. Other contacts may be completely unrelated
to the controversy. For example, if a defendant in securities litigation
conducts other business in the United States, or travels there fre-
quently on unrelated business, this might be taken into account even
if insufficient to establish jurisdiction.
The insistence that the contacts "create interests" is somewhat less
clear. Even in the state context, courts have offered no satisfactory
formulation for what kinds of interests suffice.13 6 In the federal con-
129 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 725-30 (1988).
130 See supra pp. 1225-26.
131 See generally B.J. George, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH.
L. REv. 6o9, 621-28 (1966) (discussing extraterritorial application of state law in criminal cases).
132 313 U.S. 69 (I94I).
133 See George, supra note 131, at 623.
134 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
135 Id. at 285. Because the prosecution was a state law case, the holding was based on
constitutional rather than statutory provisions.
136 See Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and
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text, we suggest that the notion of interests can best be understood in
terms of the limited power of the federal government. The federal
government must generally demonstrate an affirmative basis for reg-
ulating - such as the Commerce Clause 137 or national defense
powers' 38 - when it adopts a statute. The international context is
not distinguishable in this regard, and the affirmative bases author-
izing Congress to regulate internationally can give content to the
notion of "interests." Because the Constitution permits Congress to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, for example, the assertion of
American law over incidents arising from commercial contacts with
the United States may be considered further legitimate interests within
the meaning of the Hague test. On this view, other exercises of the
foreign affairs power create similar interests.139 A showing that the
application of United States law to a particular case will further the
exercise of the commerce or foreign affairs power demonstrates that
the requisite regulatory interest exists.
Most cases that proceed in United States courts are likely to exhibit
some contacts with the United States, if only because of the require-
ment that the court have personal jurisdiction over every defendant.
Additionally, most statutes reflect interests supportive of federal reg-
ulation - otherwise, they would be invalid as a domestic matter.
The third requirement is therefore probably the most demanding one
for Fifth Amendment purposes. Contacts and interests in themselves
do not demonstrate the fundamental fairness of holding a defendant
to legislative standards. Fairness has been an elusive concept in
conflict of laws jurisprudence, both in contexts such as personal ju-
risdiction as well as in choice of law specifically. Sometimes it is
argued that the key requirement of due process is avoidance of unfair
surprise. 140 This approach is problematic, however, because states
can avoid surprise simply by making it clear that they will subject all
litigants in their courts to local law. If mere notice would suffice, the
fairness requirement would be empty, for such notice could always be
provided.
Another approach to fairness requires that the defendant, by his
or her own actions, must have voluntarily affiliated him or herself
Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1315, 1348-49 (1981) (noting that the Hague plurality did not
'provide standards for determining when contacts are significant and interests legitimate").
137 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-4, at 305-06 (2d. ed.
1988).
13s See id. § 5-I6, at 353-55.
139 For a discussion of the bases and limits of the foreign affairs power, see id. § 4-4, at
219-25.
140 See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 182 (1964) (arguing that a Florida-
licensed insurer must have known that it would be subject to suit in Florida). See generally
RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 520-21 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing the unfair surprise argument).
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with the United States. By entering the country and engaging in
business activities there, a defendant subjects himself to United States
regulation of these activities. By purposefully bringing about harm
within the United States, the defendant submits to United States law.
On this view, although the requirements of contacts and fairness must
each be satisfied, they are interrelated - the defendant's voluntary
contacts are precisely what makes the assertion of jurisdiction fair.
Numerous difficulties are posed by this consent-based or "voluntarist"
notion of jurisdiction. 141 Yet there is no doubt that it captures some
deeply held intuitions of Anglo-American political thought about fair
subjection to sovereign power.1
42
These admittedly rather abstract observations can best be made
concrete by an examination of some contemporary problems.
B. Contemporary Applications
In surveying contemporary instances of federal extraterritoriality,
it is worthwhile to briefly examine the bases that international law
recognizes as adequate for the application of forum law. Federal
extraterritoriality has been strongly influenced by international law,
for as previously noted, Congress is presumed to act in accordance
with international law unless it specifically indicates to the contrary. 1
4 3
International law recognizes five traditional bases for the exercise of
legislative jurisdiction: 144 territorial, national, protective, passive per-
sonality, and universal jurisdiction. 1
4 5
Not all of these categories are of equal constitutional validity. As
we argue below, for instance, territoriality is a less problematic basis
for constitutional purposes than passive personality. 146 The advantage
of focusing on the categories of international law is that it allows us
to outline how constitutional and international law diverge. If extra-
territoriality violates the Constitution, it makes little difference that it
complies with the relevant principles of international law. Yet the
141 See generally Lea Brilmayer, Consent, Contract, and Territory, 74 MINN. L. REV. I, 5-
io (i989) (describing the consent theory of jurisdiction as a legal fiction intended to rationalize
a state's exercise of authority).
142 See ALAN J. SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL OBLIGATIONS 57-70 (1979)
(discussing consent to political authority).
143 See supra note i i.
144 These bases were outlined between 1932 and 1935 by an influential group of American
scholars under the direction of Manley 0. Hudson and published as The Harvard Research in
International Law. See Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 435, 445 (Supp. 1935).
145 Although the Harvard research group concerned itself exclusively with criminal jurisdic-
tion, the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law applies similar categories to civil actions.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (1987).
146 See infra pp. 1261-62.
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international law scheme still provides a useful framework because
the constitutional difficulties may vary from one category to another.
The territorial theory of jurisdiction allows a state to exercise
jurisdiction over a wrong committed, in whole or in part, within its
borders. 147 This category includes actions taken outside the territory
that have a local impact, a theory sometimes referred to as impact
territoriality or the "effects principle" of jurisdiction. 148 According to
the nationality theory, a state may exercise jurisdiction respecting any
actions committed beyond its territory by one of its own nationals. 149
The protective theory relates more directly to national security, and
allows the state to exercise jurisdiction over an offense committed
outside its territory. Jurisdiction may be asserted over an alien if the
offense is directed against the security, territorial integrity, or political
independence of that state. 150 According to the passive personality
theory, a state may exercise jurisdiction over a defendant accused of
harming a national of the state claiming jurisdiction.1
5 1
The principle of universal jurisdiction, finally, allows the assertion
of jurisdiction for certain offenses considered particularly heinous,
regardless of whether the accused has any nexus with the forum.'
5 2
The category of crimes recognized for the purposes of universal juris-
diction has traditionally been limited to offenses that all states con-
demn and thus that all states possess a universal interest in suppress-
ing. 153 Piracy, for example, has long been recognized as such a
crime.154 Such jurisdiction was expressly provided for under Article
I, section 8 of the United States Constitution, which grants Congress
the power "to define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations.'
' 55
The contemporary applications of substantive American law ex-
amined below tend to blend elements of impact territoriality, passive
personality, universal, and protective jurisdiction. The injury of an
American government agent abroad, for example, implicates both
protective jurisdiction and passive personality. If the injury occurs in
certain contexts (during a hijacking, for instance), universal jurisdic-
147 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmIt. C (1987).
14S ee id. § 402 cmt. d.
149 See id. § 402 cmt. e.
150 See id. § 402 cmt. L
Is' See id. § 402 cmt. g.
152 See id. § 404 & cmt. a.
153 See, e.g., Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial
Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1139-41 (1982); Willard B. Cowles, Universality
of Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L. REv. 177, 216-217 (I945); Kenneth C. Randall,
Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REv. 785, 788 (1988).
154 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161-62 (1820); 2 JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW § 311, at 951-53 (19o6).
155 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, Cl. 1O.
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tion may also be relevant. Nonetheless, certain types of actions are
most likely to be based on specific jurisdictional theories. We will
examine civil RICO (where jurisdiction has been based primarily on
impact territoriality), terrorism prosecutions (based primarily on pas-
sive personality and universal jurisdiction), and drug prosecutions and
related homicides (typically based on impact territoriality and protec-
tive jurisdiction). These cases merely illustrate the range of situations
to which the Constitution should be applied. The conclusion sum-
marizes the constitutional strengths and weaknesses of these contem-
porary applications and of the international law theories that they
exemplify.
i. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO). - In 1970, Congress passed as title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act, otherwise known as RICO.' 5 6 In its preamble, Congress
stated that the purpose of RICO is "to seek the eradication of orga-
nized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in
the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibi-
tions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime."15 7
The authors of RICO sought to combat the trend of organized
crime acquiring control of legitimate businesses, a trend that was quite
pronounced by the late ig6os. 5 8 The application of RICO, however,
extends beyond traditional organized crime. The statute also applies
to white-collar crime, including commercial fraud.
RICO prohibits the following activities: (i) acquiring an interest
in an enterprise by using or investing income either directly or indi-
rectly derived from a pattern of racketeering activity,'5 9 (2) acquiring
or maintaining either directly or indirectly an interest in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity,160 (3) conducting or partic-
ipating directly or indirectly in the affairs of an enterprise through a
pattern of racketeering activity, 161 and (4) conspiring to violate any of
the above-listed provisions. 16 2 The "pattern" of acts referred to in
RICO consists of acts somehow "related" to one another by a common
156 See Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ i961-1968 (1988)).
157 18 U.S.C. § i96i (quoting congressional statement of findings and purpose).
158 See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 188-90 (1967).
1s9 See i8 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988). Under i8 U.S.C. § i96i(5), a "'pattern of racketeering
activity' requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the
effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years . . . after the
commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
160 See id. § 1962(b).
161 See id. § i962(c).
162 See id. § 1962(d).
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plan or scheme. The statute provides criminal and civil remedies for
violations. Civil actions promise a plaintiff treble damages, costs of
the suit, and attorneys' fees. 163 On the criminal side, an individual
convicted under RICO may be fined, imprisoned for up to twenty
years, or both, and will be required to forfeit any proceeds derived
from the prohibited activity.164
In 1986, the Republic of the Philippines brought a civil suit against
former President Ferdinand Marcos and his wife, Imelda, under
RICO. On June 25, 1986 the District Court entered a preliminary
injunction forbidding the Marcoses from disposing of any assets except
for attorneys' fees and normal living expenses.165 The Marcoses ap-
pealed, and a panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the injunction.1
66
The Ninth Circuit then heard the case en banc and reinstated the
district court's injunction. 167
The Republic of the Philippines alleged that the Marcoses engaged
in mail fraud, wire fraud, and the transportation of stolen property
in either the foreign or interstate commerce of the United States. The
Republic asserted that the acts were repeated, forming a pattern of
predicate acts sufficient under RICO to give rise to civil liability. 168
Specifically, the complaint alleged that the Marcoses and other defen-
dants arranged for investment of four million fraudulently obtained
dollars in Beverly Hills real estate. 169 The Republic further claimed
that the Marcoses plotted for the creation of two bank accounts in
the name of Imelda Marcos at Lloyds Bank of California that totaled
over $8oo,ooo, and that these funds were also fraudulently ac-
quired. 170 The complaint alleged that the Marcoses transported to
Hawaii wrongfully obtained money, jewels and other property worth
over $7,000,000. 171
The court held that the activity in question "forms a pattern [for
RICO purposes] if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of com-
mission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events.' 72 The court determined that the epi-
sodes involved in the case were not isolated events. Rather, they
163 See id. § 1964(c).
164 See id. § 1963(a).
165 See Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 8W8 F.2d 1473, 1477 (9 th Cir. 1987).
166 See id. at 1490.
167 See Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1364 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 1035 (989).
16s See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988).
169 See Marcos, 862 F.2d at 1358.
170 See id.
171 See id.
172 Id. (quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.14 (1985) (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1988))).
1992] 1247
HeinOnline -- 105 Harv. L. Rev.  1247 1991-1992
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
represented "a plan and a practice" of removing "the fruits of fraud"
from the Philippines to the United States. 173 Although the gravamen
of the Republic's case was that the Marcoses stole Philippine public
money,174 the court found American law applicable because the Mar-
coses' utilized the United States mails and wires to invest the "fruits
of the fraud" and illegally transported these fruits in interstate com-
merce. 17
5
The Marcos case illustrates the impact territoriality theory of ex-
traterritoriality. The family engaged in theft and fraud outside of the
United States, but directed the proceeds of this theft into the country.
A parallel can thus be drawn between Marcos and products liability
cases in which a manufacturer deliberately ships a defective product
into the forum in which it causes injury. If application of forum law
to this product liability action would be constitutionally permissible
in the state choice of law context, application of American RICO law
would probably be constitutional in the Marcos case.
Although the Supreme Court has not ruled that application of
forum law to precisely this sort of products liability case would be
constitutional, this conclusion seems a fair implication from existing
precedents. The Court has twice held that insurance companies with
headquarters outside the forum state could be subjected to local law
when the insured risk eventuated in the forum. 176 In one of these
cases, Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,177 forum law
allowed direct actions against insurance companies, and the forum
was permitted to apply this rule to an out-of-state insurer with no
other local contacts. 178 In upholding the application of the law, the
Court reasoned that the forum state's interest in protecting the rights
of persons injured locally mandated subjecting the insurance company
to the direct action law. 179 Similarly, a manufacturer who deliberately
shipped defective products into the state could be held to local law.
A different outcome might result if the impact in the forum was
completely unforseen. The Marcos case does not present this problem,
however, because the Marcoses deliberately sent the money into the
United States.
It might be objected that Marcos differs from products liability
cases because the injury (theft of public moneys) did not occur in the
173 Id.
174 It was alleged that during his 20 years as president, Mr. Marcos used his position of
authority and power to embezzle funds and property that belonged to the Philippines and to its
people. See id. at 1359.
17S See id. at 1358.
176 See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, i81 (1964); Vatson v. Employers Liab.
Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 67-68, 74 (1954).
177 348 U.S. 66 (I954).
17S See id. at 73-74.
179 See id. at 71-73.
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United States but in the Philippines. But this argument ignores that
a basic purpose of RICO is to declare investment of ill-gotten gains
an additional wrong. 180 Indeed, the application of RICO to the Mar-
cos facts represents, in some respect, a stronger case for extraterritorial
jurisdiction than the application of local law to products liability cases
involving out-of-state manufacture. In the usual products liability
case, applying local law would subject the defendant's out of state
activities to the law of the forum. RICO, in contrast, could potentially
permit the use of foreign law to define the underlying criminal activity
while using American law for the regulation of subsequent investment
of the proceeds in the United States. 18'
2. Anti-Terrorism Laws. - If civil RICO in the Marcos case
exemplifies impact territoriality, our antiterrorism laws exemplify the
principles of universal jurisdiction and passive personality. The cat-
egory of universal offenses is quickly expanding. International instru-
ments provide for universal jurisdiction for particular crimes, although
it is unclear whether jurisdiction in these circumstances is obligatory
only for those states which have become party to these agreements. 182
Increasingly, international law applies universal jurisdiction to acts of
terrorism. 183
On June i1, 1985, Fawaz Yunis and four others boarded a Royal
Jordanian Airlines flight in Beirut carrying assault rifles and grenades.
Yunis took control of the cockpit and forced the pilot to take off. ' 8 4
The remaining hijackers held the passengers, including two American
citizens, hostage in their seats. The hijackers explained that they
wanted a meeting with delegates to the Arab League Conference then
underway in Tunis.18 5 After several frustrated efforts to land in
various Mediterranean cities, the hijackers returned to Beirut. At
Beirut the hijackers released the passengers, held a press conference
1s0 See I8 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (I988); see also United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1334
(5th Cir. 1983) (stating that investment of the proceeds of racketeering activity in an interstate
enterprise is an essential element of the RICO offense), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984), and
474 U.S. 994 (x985).
181 The Marcos court only considered application of American law to claims involving crimes
alleged to have occurred within the United States. See Republic of the Phil. v. Marcos, 818
F.2d 1473, 1477-79 (9 th Cir. 1987), aff'd en banc, 862 F.2d 1355 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1035 (1989); cf. Michael Goldsmith & Vicki Rinne, Civil RICO, Foreign Defendants, and "ET,"
73 MINN. L. REV. 1023, 1039-40 (989) (suggesting that the extraterritorial application of RICO
poses less of a foreign relations problem than the application of other laws because the activities
RICO penalizes are criminal in other nations as well).
182 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 cmt. a (1987).
183 For example, the United States and six Latin American states have adopted a convention
providing for universal jurisdiction for terrorist crimes. See Convention to Prevent and Punish
the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That
Are of International Significance, Feb. 2, 1971, 27 U.S.T. 3949.
184 See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d io86, O89 (D.C. Cir. i99i).
185 See id.
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demanding that Palestinians leave Lebanon, blew up the plane, and
left the airport. American investigators identified Yunis as the leader
of the hijackers.1
86
In September, 1987, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
launched "Operation Goldenrod" for the purpose of arresting Yunis.
The FBI lured Yunis onto a yacht off Cyprus with the promise of a
drug deal and arrested him after he entered international waters.
American agents flew Yunis to Washington, D.C., where he was
charged with conspiracy, hostage-taking, aircraft damage, and air
piracy. 1
8 7
The Federal Government asserted jurisdiction over Yunis pursuant
to two statutes: the Hostage Taking Act'88 and the Antihijacking Act
of 1974.189 The Hostage Taking Act provides in part:
(a) [W]hoever, whether inside or outside the United States, seizes
or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, or to continue to detain
another person in order to compel a third person or a governmental
organization to do or abstain from doing any act ... shall be punished
by imprisonment for any term of years or for life.
(b)(i) It is not an offense under this section if the conduct required
for the offense occurred outside the United States unless,
(A) the offender or the person seized or detained is a national of
the United States;
(B) the offender is found in the United States; or
(C) the governmental organization sought to be compelled is the
government of the United States. 190
The Antihijacking Act' 91 provides for the punishment of individ-
uals who hijack aircraft operating outside the jurisdiction of the
United States provided the hijackers are later "found in the United
States."1 92 The Yunis court found that, under the Antihijacking Act,
it was irrelevant how Yunis entered the United States. Once he was
within American territory, he had been properly indicted and could
be prosecuted.193 The court concluded that under the universal and
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988).
189 49 U.S.C. app. § 1472(n) (x988).
190 I8 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988).
191 The Antihijacking Act was enacted in response to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (the "Hague Convention"), Dec. i6, 8970, 22 U.S.T. 1643, 86o
U.N.T.S. io5. See Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1092. This Convention requires signatory nations to
extradite or punish hijackers found within their territory. See id.
192 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n)(i) (8988).
193 The Yunis Court contended that "Congress intended the statutory term 'found in the
United States' to parallel the Hague Convention's [term] present in a [contracting state's] terri-
tory," and not to require the voluntary submission to the state's jurisdiction by the offender.
Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1092.
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the passive personality theories of international jurisdiction, the
United States could prosecute Yunis on the hostage-taking charge as
well as on the hijacking charge,194 and affirmed Yunis' conviction.195
The court, however, did not completely ignore the issue of extra-
territorial application of the Constitution. Yunis had relied on United
States v. Toscanino196 in arguing that his seizure had been illegal.
Toscanino created a limited exception to the so-called Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, which declared that "the power of a court to try a person
for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought within
the court's jurisdiction by reason of a forcible abduction."'1 97 Under
Toscanino, a court was not free to assert personal jurisdiction if the
government committed a "deliberate, unnecessary and unreasonable
invasion of the accused's constitutional rights."'198 In response, the
Yunis court concluded that "[although] the government's conduct was
neither 'picture perfect' nor a 'model for law enforcement behavior,"'
Yunis' Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights had not been violated,
because nothing in the record suggested intentional or outrageous
government misconduct. 19 9 In so ruling, the court cited Sami v.
United States,20 0 which held that there would be no actionable con-
stitutional claim if the court could not find shocking behavior.
Although the Yunis court seemed to acknowledge a role for the
Constitution in assessing the means by which Yunis was apprehended,
it did not inquire into Fifth Amendment due process limits on the
application of federal law. Further, it is questionable whether Yunis
would meet the usual constitutional tests for the extraterritorial ap-
plication of law in the state choice of law context. As noted earlier,
the three considerations are contacts, interests, and fairness. 20 1 First,
Yunis' contacts with the United States were quite tenuous. It was
sheer happenstance that the plane Yunis and his fellow hijackers
detained carried American citizens, and it is difficult to argue that the
mere presence of United States nationals aboard a non-American air-
craft provides a sufficient jurisdictional nexus between Yunis' actions
and the United States. The Antihijacking Act provided for jurisdic-
tion because the defendant was "found" within American territory,
and this apparently supplies a second contact. But as one scholar has
noted, when an accused's "presence is not directly related to the
194 See id. at 1091-92.
19- See id. at o99.
196 5oo F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974).
197 Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (952) (citing Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (i888)).
198 Toscanino, 5oo F.2d at 275.
199 Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1093 (quoting United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953, 969 (D.C. Cir.
1988)).
200 617 F.2d 755, 774 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cited in Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1093.
201 See supra pp. 1242-44.
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offense charged . . . jurisdiction on that basis seems too self-generated
to pass constitutional muster."20 2 Here, the fear of self-generated
jurisdiction is particularly acute: Yunis was only found in the country
because American officials kidnapped him and took him to the United
States.
Although Yunis' contacts with the United States were sparse, the
interests of the forum in his case were more substantial. Congress
certainly has a general interest in effectively dealing with hijacking.
The prosecution of hijackers also arguably protects Congress's interest
in regulating commerce with other nations. But it is less clear that
Congress has sufficient interest in hijackings unconnected to the
United States. Furthermore, meeting the fairness requirement is dif-
ficult. It does not appear that Yunis purposefully sought to bring
about harm within the United States or even sought to harm United
States citizens. Yunis' objective was to influence the Arab League
meeting in Tunis, and the Americans were on the Jordanian aircraft
by mere coincidence. Therefore, it hardly appears that the defendant
voluntarily submitted himself to American law by committing actions
directed against the United States.
This analysis appears to present serious obstacles to the prosecution
of terrorists who unintentionally harm American citizens abroad. One
factor that makes terrorism distinctive, however, and arguably pre-
serves the constitutionality of the Yunis decision, is the phrasing of
Article I, Section 8. This provision specifically grants Congress the
power "[tlo define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas and offenses against the Laws of Nations." 20 3 The drafters
of this clause may well have anticipated its application to cases with
no overt connection to the United States, for most piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas and most offenses against the law of
nations would have no nexus with American territory. This leaves
the question whether the Fifth Amendment, adopted at a later point,
alters the clause by imposing a jurisdictional requirement. 20 4 Given
202 Lowenfeld, supra note 76, at 893.
203 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. Io.
204 The Supreme Court held that no impediment existed to a prosecution based on extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction in United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 61o, 630-31 (1817):
The question, whether this act [punishing piracy on the high seas] extends farther than
to American citizens, or to persons on board American vessels, or to offenses committed
against citizens of the United States, is not without its difficulties. The [C]onstitution
having conferred on Congress the power of defining and punishing piracy, there can be
no doubt of the right of the legislature to enact laws punishing pirates, although they
may be foreigners, and may have committed no particular offense against the United
States. The only question is, has the legislature enacted such a law?
There are two problems with the Court's reasoning in Palmer. First, the Court did not
consider the Fifth Amendment issue. Second, the Court's logic is questionable. Every exercise
of federal power must be based on some source of federal authority. The existence of a source
of federal power does not automatically negate the limitations imposed by the Bill of Rights.
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that the clause arguably authorizes a form of universal jurisdiction,
and that the Fifth Amendment does not specifically address crimes
detailed by the clause, one might conclude that the answer is no.
In United States v. Davis,205 however, the Ninth Circuit decided
that a Fifth Amendment inquiry into the constitutionality of extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction was required. 20 6 The defendant was convicted of
violating the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act, 20 7 which specif-
ically applies to drug traffic outside the territorial boundaries of the
United States. 208 After recognizing that Article I, Section 8 gave
Congress the power to define and punish felonies upon the high
seas, 209 the court stated that any law enacted pursuant to this clause
must also satisfy the Fifth Amendment. 210 After examining the facts
of the case, the court found that a sufficient nexus between the de-
fendant and the United States existed to satisfy the Due Process
Clause. 
21 1
Although the case has not to this point had much precedential
impact, the facts of Davis suggest why the additional Fifth Amend-
ment inquiry is warranted. If the Fifth Amendment were not perti-
nent, Congress could punish any conduct upon the high seas that it
chose to define as a felony, regardless of whether it had any connection
with the United States or whether (as in Davis) the accused is a
noncitizen. To take an extreme example, Congress could criminalize
a high stakes poker game between two Australians sailing an Austra-
lian sailboat from Australia to Fiji. In the context of universal juris-
diction, the exercise of extensive congressional powers seems unprob-
lematic because only especially heinous crimes, as identified by
international law, give rise to the power to prosecute without a nexus.
The "piracy" portion of Article I, Section 8 is therefore not problem-
atic. But if the Fifth Amendment is inapplicable whenever Congress
invokes Article i, Section 8, then Congress can prohibit any conduct
that it chooses to, as long as the conduct takes place on the high seas
and Congress deems the crime a felony.
For this reason, the Piracy Clause does not resolve the choice of
law problem. A better explanation for the Yunis result would rely
upon the fact that Congress, in providing for the prosecution of hi-
jackers, did not attempt to criminalize conduct that was legal where
205 9o5 F.2d 245 (9 th Cir. 199o), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 753 (i991).
206 See id. at 248.
207 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 19o3(a), (j) (West Supp. 1991).
208 See id. § 19 03(c)(i)(D)-(E). The defendant's sailing vessel was intercepted approximately
35 miles southwest of Point Reyes, California, with a cargo of drugs. See Davis, 905 F.2d at
247.
209 See Davis, 905 F.2d at 248.
210 See id,
211 See id at 249.
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it occurred, but rather merely established an American mechanism for
the enforcement of international law. Yunis's activities did not neces-
sitate a choice of law analysis because his activities were prohibited
everywhere. Because universal jurisdiction exists only when certain
norms of international law are violated, and because domestic courts
have a valid and important role to play in international law
enforcement 212 (because, indeed, domestic courts are typically the only
forum available for international criminal prosecution), no nexus with
the United States need be shown. Universal jurisdiction traditionally
existed almost entirely for crimes committed beyond the territorial
boundaries of any nation, such as piracy. Uniform international law,
universally enforceable, was the only solution to the problem, and it
presents no choice of law problems today.
3. Drugs, Protective Jurisdiction, and Passive Personality. -
United States drug laws do not exhibit the universal jurisdiction of
our antiterrorism laws. Nonetheless, aggressive application of these
laws to extraterritorial events is not uncommon. In United States v.
Benitez,213 the defendant was a Colombian national convicted of
conspiring to murder United States Drug Enforcement Administration
(DEA) agents in Colombia.214 Benitez objected to the District Court's
jurisdiction on the grounds that he was not a United States citizen
and that the acts in question had not occurred in the United States. 215
On appeal, the court noted that the crimes for which Benitez had
been convicted included assault upon United States DEA agents,
attempted murder of United States DEA agents, and the theft of
United States Government property. 216 The court accordingly found
jurisdiction under both the protective and passive personality princi-
ples of jurisdiction.
21 7
Benitez involved a DEA operation in Colombia known as "Tibu-
ron." Two DEA special agents were sent to Colombian airfields to
investigate possible shipments of drugs to the United States. The
agents carried United States Government passports and were in Col-
ombia with the approval of the Colombian Government.218 Ren6
Benitez, a Colombian fugitive from American justice who had been
a target of the DEA operation, discovered the agents, took them
prisoner, and held them over a two-day period. During this time, he
shot the agents repeatedly, although not fatally.
2 19
212 See generally Brilmayer, A Modest Proposal, supra note ii, at 2729 (critiquing the view
that American courts should not become involved in questions of international law).
213 741 F.2d 1312 (iith Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1137 (1985).
214 See id. at 1313-15.
21s See id. at 1316.
216 See id.
217 See id.
213 See id. at 1313.
219 See id. at 13i5.
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The court found jurisdiction under the protective principle because
the crime had a potentially adverse effect upon the security or gov-
ernmental functions of the nation. 220 In addition, the court found
that jurisdiction could be based on the nationality or national char-
acter of the victim. 22 1 The Benitez court did not frame the question
in Fifth Amendment terms nor did it ask about contacts, interests, or
fairness.
In Benitez, the victims' status as United States DEA officials
provides the crime's only "contact" with the forum. Arguably, suffi-
cient American interests existed because the defendant threatened a
United States Government drug operation pursued with the acquies-
cence of the Colombian Government. Indeed, the court viewed the
"Tiburon" operation as implicating national security concerns because
the operation was directly connected with "the governmental functions
of the nation. '2
22
The real question in Benitez dissolves into the third prong of the
analysis - fundamental fairness. Did Benitez, by his own action,
somehow voluntarily and knowingly affiliate himself with the United
States? According to the facts of the case, Ren6 Benitez and his
brother, Armando, searched the agents for personal effects, and took
their official and personal passports and their DEA credentials. After
inspecting the credentials, Ren6 said, "[tihese are the guys. They are
both DEA agents." One agent asked to call the American Embassy.
Ren6 Benitez replied, "[y]ou are not going to call the Embassy." He
pointed his cocked pistol at the agent's head and stated, "[t]his is the
only law in Colombia."22
3
Although the assault might properly be penalized under Colombian
law, its perpetration against American agents should not make a
prosecution under United States law permissible. Indeed, the Benitez
court's reasoning has not been accepted in the state choice of law
context, and it should not be accepted here. 224 It is hard to argue
that it is fair to subject citizens of foreign nations to United States
law simply because Americans choose to travel abroad, yet the court's
passive personality theory allows precisely this result.22 5 The as-
sumption that Americans take their local law along with them when
visiting other nations reflects the aggressively unilateral character of
American jurisdictional law. The inquiry only focuses on whether the
220 See id. at 1316.
221 See id.
222 Id.
223 Id. at 1314.
224 Cf. United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 359 (sth Cir. 1979) (holding that
the court lacked jurisdiction when the victim of the theft occurring in Mexico was American;
unclear whether the decision was based on international or constitutional law).
225 See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
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United States has an interest in having its law applied; it does not
justify application of American law to citizens of other nations. As
American citizens, we do not anticipate being subjected to Colombian
law if we injure a Colombian citizen here in the United States. Anal-
ogously, theft of an American passport in Colombia should not be an
offense against American law.
The strongest argument that the application of American law was
constitutional in Benitez was that the defendants sought out the drug
agents specifically because they were Americans. This is a stronger
basis than passive personality and arguably represents a purposeful
contact with the United States. If Benitez is correct, it is because of
this factor and not merely because the victims were American. Not
all drug cases, however, include this added element. One extreme
example is United States v. Marino-Garcia.226 The federal statute at
issue in Marino-Garcia prohibited possession of controlled substances
with an intent to distribute, and specifically applied to any "vessel
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. ' '227 The statute defined
"vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" to include
stateless vessels. 228 As the court framed it, the issue was whether the
United States might apply its law to stateless vessels absent any proof
of a nexus with the United States.
229
In upholding the application of American law, the court noted that
the legislative history revealed an intent to exercise jurisdiction to the
maximum extent allowed under international law,230 and concluded
that international law permitted application of United States law be-
cause the vessel was stateless. 231 But whatever significance stateless-
ness has for international law, its relevance for constitutional due
process limits is extremely hard to discern. Although the court ex-
amined the statute for unconstitutional vagueness, 232 thus implicitly
recognizing that the defendant was entitled to a modicum of Fifth
Amendment protection, it did not address the possibility that due
process might require a nexus for purposes of applying American law.
It did point out in a footnote, however, that the United States had
been conducting similar searches for so long that the defendant should
have been put on notice that such a search might occur.233
226 679 F.2d 1373 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983); cf. United States v. Gonzales,
776 F.2d 931, 938 (iith Cir. 1985) (applying American law even though no nexus existed
between the defendant and the United States when the state under which the vessel involved
was registered consented).
227 Maritime Drug Enforcement Act, 46 U.S.C.A. app. § 1903(a) (West Supp. i99i).
228 Id. § 1903(c)(1)(A).
229 See Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d at 1379.
230 See id.
231 See id. at 1378 n.3.
232 See id. at 1383.
233 See id. at 1384 n.ig. The court also suggested that all nations should permit searches
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4. Drugs, RICO, and Conspiracy: The Noriega Case. - A juris-
dictional issue also arose in the celebrated case of United States v.
Noriega.2 34 The facts underlying the case are well known. In Feb-
ruary, 1988, a federal grand jury in Miami indicted General Manuel
Noriega for conspiracy to transport cocaine into and out of the United
States. 235 General Noriega (along with Lieutenant Colonel Luis Del
Cid) was charged with a pattern of racketeering activity in violation
of the RICO statutes as well as various violations of the drug law.236
General Noriega was charged as a "principal" for violating the Travel
Act, 237 participating in a racketeering enterprise, 23s and conspiring to
import, distribute, and/or manufacture cocaine for sale in the United
States. 23
9
On December 20, 1989, President Bush ordered United States
combat troops into Panama City on a mission with the goal, inter
alia, of seizing General Noriega to face the indictment in the United
States.2 40 Not long after the invasion, Lieutenant Colonel Del Cid,
the commander of two thousand Panamanian troops, surrendered to
American forces. The apprehension of General Noriega took longer,
but after eleven days in the Papal Nunciature in Panama City, General
Noriega surrendered as well. 241
In finding jurisdiction, the court noted that, even if extraterritorial
conduct produces no effect in the United States, a defendant can still
be reached if he intended to produce an effect in the United States or
is part of a conspiracy in which some co-conspirator's activities oc-
curred in American territory.242 Supporting its conclusion, the Court
cited Justice Holmes's opinion in Strassheim v. Daily243 for the prop-
osition that "'[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce
or producing effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause
of the harm as if [the accused] had been present at the effect, if the
State should succeed in getting him within its power.' ' '244 The impact
of stateless vessels. See id. The court's suggestion implicates an argument based on universal
jurisdiction as deployed in Yunis. See supra pp. 1249-54. However, recourse to universal
jurisdiction does not resolve the constitutional problems with the court's reasoning, for its
reasoning was not limited to activities permitted by the laws of all nations. In the court's view,
the allowance of the searches by the laws of all states was merely coincidental and not integral
to the holding.
234 746 F. Supp. 15o6 (S.D. Fla. x99o).
235 See id. at i5io.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 1517 (detailing violations of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3) (1988)).
238 See Noriega, 746 F. Supp. at i51O.
239 See id.
240 See id. at 1Sl.
241 See id.
242 See id. at 1513-14.
243 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
244 Noriega, 746 F. Supp at 1513 (quoting Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U. S. 280, 285 (91.))
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territoriality theory of jurisdiction expounded by Justice Holmes in-
deed supports the Noriega court's result. Importation of drugs has a
direct and deliberate effect in the United States, which is enough
under Strassheim to support application of American law. As Justice
Holmes suggested, however, the impact theory limits itself to situa-
tions in which the consequences for the forum were intended or pur-
poseful.
A quite different question would arise if the sole basis for obtaining
jurisdiction over Noriega consisted of his alleged role in a conspiracy.
Under a conspiracy theory of extraterritoriality, Noriega could be held
to American law by virtue of his co-conspirators' acts in the United
States.245 This theory has been used in establishing personal jurisdic-
tion over absent defendants, 24 6 and, in the context of venue, the
conspiracy theory has been justified by recourse to the defendant's
((constructive presence." 247
If the defendant purposefully sends someone, such as an agent,
into the forum state, it is clear that jurisdiction over the defendant
will not violate due process under state choice of law theory. In
Young v. Masci,248 the Supreme Court upheld the application of a
New York vicarious liability law to a New Jersey resident who had
given a third party permission to drive his car into New York. The
Court rested its argument on the grounds that "[a] person who sets in
motion in one State the means by which injury is inflicted in another
may, consistently with the due process clause, be made liable for that
injury whether the means employed be a responsible agent or an
irresponsible instrument. '249 According to the Court, the defendant
had "subjected himself" to New York law.
250
The problem with the conspiracy theory, however, is that it po-
tentially extends beyond this principle, and in RICO cases far beyond
it. Once a defendant joins a conspiracy, she is responsible for all acts
taken in furtherance of the conspiracy even if those acts were not
within the defendant's contemplation. 25 1 This feature of conspiracy
jurisdiction has bothered commentators on personal jurisdiction.
25 2 It
245 See George, supra note 131, at 619, 623.
246 See Ann Althouse, The Use of Conspiracy Theory to Establish In Personam Jurisdiction:
A Due Process Analysis, 52 FORDHAMi L. REV. 234, 254-55 (1983); Lea Brilnayer & Kathleen
Paisley, Personal Jurisdiction and Substantive Legal Relations: Corporations, Conspiracies, and
Agency, 74 CAL. L. REv. i, 29 (1q86); Stuart M. Riback, Note, The Long Arm and Multiple
Defendants: The Conspiracy Theory of In Personam Jurisdiction, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 5-06, 509-
10 (1984).
247 Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 362 (IgI).
248 289 U.S. 253 (1933).
249 Id. at 258.
250 Id.
251 See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-47 (1946).
252 See, e.g., Althouse, supra note 246, at 253; Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 246, at 36;
Riback, supra note 246, at 522.
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violates due process because it requires no showing of purposefulness
or foreseeability. In the choice of law context, for example, a defen-
dant could be subjected to local law merely because a co-conspirator
happened into the forum and committed an overt act, regardless of
whether the defendant had any idea of the co-conspirator's presence.
This result goes far beyond both Strassheim and Young.
The best response to this objection is that the problem is really an
issue of substantive conspiracy law. The unfairness of the assertion
of jurisdiction reflects the unfairness of the substantive result; the
proper remedy would lie in revising the substantive law of conspiracy.
In other words, conspiracy jurisdiction should not violate due process
if the substantive conspiracy theory does not itself violate due process.
The Court's toleration of the theory as a matter of substantive law
indicates that it must be accepted as a matter of jurisdictional law.
But this response is misconceived. Even if conspiracy law is sub-
stantively constitutional, it does not necessarily follow that the con-
spiracy law may constitutionally be applied to a foreign defendant
with only the most attenuated links to an American forum. A con-
spiracy arguably extends the reach of forum jurisdiction because the
actions of one co-conspirator are attributed to the others. According
to this argument, activities in the forum are the activities of the absent
defendant for jurisdictional purposes. This attribution only works,
however, because a legal rule belonging to the forum makes the
attribution possible. The question remains - what authority gives
the forum the right to apply its conspiracy theory in the first place?
Using conspiracy to justify application of American law is choice
of law bootstrapping. It involves applying American law to justify
the application of American law.25 3 Conspiracy theory may justify
subjecting the defendant to RICO (or some other substantive law),
but it cannot justify subjecting the defendant to our conspiracy
laws. 25 4 Courts must answer the question of purposeful connection
with the forum before they presume our conspiracy laws are applica-
ble. Because the conspiracy test is not as stringent as the usual
jurisdictional standard of purposefulness, some substantive conspira-
cies should not be reachable as a matter of due process. Conspiracy
theory does not obviate the need to inquire into the defendant's pur-
poseful connections with the forum - a central element of fairness in
253 In the analogous context of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has been loathe to
permit states to attribute the contacts of one defendant to another. See, e.g., Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, 465 U.S. 770, 781 n.13 (1984) ("Each defendant's contacts with the forum State must
be assessed individually."); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 331-32 (z98o) (holding that contacts
must be shown as to each defendant).
254 For recognition of the choice of law problems in establishing jurisdiction through con-
spiracy law, see Brilmayer & Paisley, supra note 246, at 37.
1992] 1259
HeinOnline -- 105 Harv. L. Rev.  1259 1991-1992
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
due process analysis. Assertions of American law in conspiracy cases
should meet the Strassheim test.2 5 5
IV. CONCLUSIONS: A CONSTITUTIONAL ASSESSMENT
In one respect, the Constitution appears inadequate for restraining
excesses of legislative jurisdiction. Foreign citizens might feel that
they should not be required to rely on American law itself as a defense
against American overreaching. After all, foreigners have no say
concerning the Constitution's position on the assertion of jurisdiction
over foreigners. In this sense, the Constitution cannot solve all fair-
ness problems;25 6 the overreaching must be addressed through the
vehicle of international law.
But international law, conversely, does not address all of the prob-
lems covered by the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, satisfying inter-
national law does not automatically meet the due process standard.
The framework provided by international law, however, is helpful in
identifying the cases most likely to pose constitutional problems. Ju-
risdiction asserted against Americans is unlikely to present constitu-
tional problems, for the defendant's home state has a constitutionally
recognized basis for regulation. 257 Territorial jurisdiction, due to its
historical pedigree, is also unlikely to violate the Due Process
Clause. 258 As previously noted, the only two territoriality caseg that
might offend the Constitution are those impact territoriality cases in
which the local consequences are not foreseeable, and those conspiracy
cases in which the defendant had no advance warning or control over
the co-conspirator's actions in the forum.
Universal jurisdiction appears to present a more difficult consti-
tutional issue, because it does not require a nexus between the forum
and the dispute. This problem vanishes, however, once it is recog-
nized that the forum does not really apply its own law, but rather
enforces international law that has been incorporated into domestic
law. The forum merely provides a mechanism for the implementation
of norms that, in theory, are universally in effect. We say "in theory"
because some nations might, contrary to international law, actually
encourage hijackings. A genuine choice of law problem would present
itself if a hijacking occurred in a state that authorized such conduct
255 See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620-24 (1927) (applying the Strassheim
formula and upholding the application of American law in a conspiracy case).
256 The Supreme Court has held that the Constitution permits transient jurisdiction without
regard to its international law status. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 1Io S. Ct. 2205, 2115
(I99O). But cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw § 421 cmt. e (1987)
(rejecting transient jurisdiction).
257 See supra p. 1242.
258 See supra p. 1242.
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by positive law. However, such choice of law issues seldom arise
because states have acted in this manner and because the defendant
has no claim to immunity from international legal standards.
The most difficult categories of extraterritorial jurisdiction are pas-
sive personality and protective jurisdiction. They are related in that
neither requires a connection between the defendant and the forum,
aside from the United States or one of its nationals having suffered
an injury. These theories do not even require that the defendant be
aware that he or she has caused harm to an American or to the United
States government. The Restatement has expressed doubts concerning
the international status of the passive personality principle in certain
categories of cases. 259 We express similar reservations as a matter of
constitutional law. The Supreme Court has never upheld the appli-
cation of state law on the grounds that a forum resident, temporarily
present in another state, suffered injury there (although it has never
explicitly invalidated such an application). The strongest arguments
in support of allowing passive personality and protective principles
involve the defense of United States interests. But if the Fifth Amend-
ment applies to federal extraterritoriality (as argued above), then na-
tional interests are only one ingredient in the due process calculus.
Passive personality and protective theories are hard to justify in terms
of fairness to the defendant unless the defendant acted with some
degree of intent to cause an impact in the forum.
Unfortunately, the cases examined above indicate that claims of
right by individuals may indeed come into sharp conflict with percep-
tions of national interests. This unfortunate fact is illustrated not only
by the terrorism statutes, but also by the Noriega and Marcos pros-
ecutions. In the former, a popular president pursuing a popular po-
litical agenda (the war on drugs) might not have been overly concerned
with fine points of constitutional or international law. In the latter,
our nation not only possessed its own motivations for pursuing the
Marcos's wealth, but also wanted to be viewed as helpful to a sym-
pathetic new government in the Philippines. This is not the place to
debate where the true national interest may lie. Perhaps national
interests would not be served by any of these applications of American
law, in which case national interests and individual rights coincide. 260
Nonetheless, a theoretical conflict would still remain. The proper
accommodation of individual rights and national interests would at
259 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 cmt. g (1987) (stating
that the passive personality principle is not generally applicable to ordinary torts or crimes); see
also Goldsmith & Rinne, supra note I8i, at 1045-46 & nn. 83-84 (noting that the passive
personality principle has not been widely accepted).
260 For example, an isolationist might argue that the United States should not be involved
in policing corruption around the world. It is arguable that penalizing theft of money from the
Philippines treasury, as in Marcos, does not satisfy any American interest.
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some point need to be addressed, because sooner or later a true
divergence would occur. In such cases, courts should uphold individ-
ual rights. These are not cases where courts can remain beyond the
fray by refusing to intervene in exclusion proceedings or by declining
to issue writs of habeas corpus. 261 These are cases in which the elected
branches of government have sought the assistance of the courts in
enforcing American law. If courts, especially Article Ill courts, are
asked to decide cases, they must decide them in accordance with the
Constitution.
26 2
This argument concedes that the Constitution operates more im-
portantly as a shield than as a sword. It attempts to preserve the
integrity of courts that are asked affirmatively to involve themselves
in the effectuation of unconstitutional policies. As Henry Hart argued,
"so long at least as Congress feels impelled to invoke the assistance
of courts, the supremacy of law in their decisions is assured. ' '263 When
asked affirmatively to apply American law to controversies having no
connection with the United States, and when application of American
law would be fundamentally unfair, courts should invoke the Fifth
Amendment. Under current law, courts could otherwise become in-
volved in overly aggressive assertions of American foreign policy with-
out an opportunity to ask the proper constitutional questions.
When standards of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause are
treated as parallel to those of the Fourteenth Amendment, the fate of
foreigners is tied to the fate of American citizens. 264 Foreigners will
possess the same due process protection against federal overreaching
as American citizens possess against the laws of sister states. Denying
this basic protection is hard to justify - what is unfair to a citizen
is also unfair to a noncitizen. 265 Admittedly, national interests may
prove stronger than the interests of competing states, but there is
room for including this factor in the due process calculus. Due pro-
cess, however, does require considering fairness to the defendant in
addition to state or national interests.
Hopefully, few cases will present these difficulties. Congress has
typically been silent on the extraterritorial reach of federal legislation.
Consequently, potential problems of unfairness can be avoided entirely
through deft interpretation. When Congress does specify territorial
reach, it rarely tries to make statutes universally applicable, and when
it spells out the range of cases to which one of its statute does apply,
it will likely require the types of connections that would satisfy the
261 See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 790-91 (I95O).
262 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
263 Hart, supra note 1io, at 1383.
264 See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 82-87 (198o) (discussing virtual
representation).
265 See supra pp. 1234-37.
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Fifth Amendment (as well as international law). However, courts and
litigants should keep constitutional limitations in mind. A court
should consider potential constitutional limits when it interprets a
statute that is silent on territorial reach, for courts typically construe
statutes to avoid raising constitutional difficulties. 2 66 With due aware-
ness of potential constitutional considerations, Fifth Amendment due
process problems of federal extraterritoriality will be rare. If Congress
ever does force the issue, however, courts must stand prepared to
enforce the Fifth Amendment's limits on international choice of law.
266 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 341-45 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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